The Right to Appeal by Robertson, Cassandra Burke
Case Western Reserve University 
School of Law Scholarly Commons 
Faculty Publications 
2013 
The Right to Appeal 
Cassandra Burke Robertson 
Case Western University School of Law, cassandra.robertson@case.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications 
 Part of the Litigation Commons 
Repository Citation 
Robertson, Cassandra Burke, "The Right to Appeal" (2013). Faculty Publications. 58. 
https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/faculty_publications/58 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of Case 
Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons. 
CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219 
 
 
THE RIGHT TO APPEAL* 
CASSANDRA BURKE ROBERTSON** 
It is time for the Supreme Court to explicitly recognize a 
constitutional right to appeal. Over the last century, both the 
federal and state judicial systems have increasingly relied on 
appellate remedies to protect essential rights. In spite of the 
modern importance of such remedies, however, the Supreme 
Court has repeatedly declined to recognize a due process right 
to appeal in either civil or criminal cases. Instead, it has 
repeated nineteenth-century dicta denying the right of appeal, 
and it has declined petitions for certiorari in both civil and 
criminal cases that seek to persuade the Court to reconsider 
that position. 
This Article argues that a right to appeal protects both private 
litigants and the justice system as a whole. First, doctrinal 
consistency necessitates the explicit recognition of a 
constitutional right to appeal—a right that the Supreme 
Court’s criminal and punitive damages doctrines have already 
implicitly recognized. Second, the modern procedural system 
has developed in a way that relies on appellate remedies as 
part of fundamental due process. Traditional procedural 
safeguards—such as the jury trial and the executive clemency 
process—may once have sufficiently protected due process 
rights. In the modern era, however, these procedures have 
diminished at the same time that reliance on appeals has 
grown. As a result, if appellate remedies are removed from the 
procedural framework, the system as a whole cannot provide 
adequate due process protection. Finally, recognizing 
constitutional protection for appellate rights would also 
express a normative policy choice, promoting the values of 
institutional legitimacy, respect for individual dignity, 
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predictability, and accuracy. Appellate procedure has earned a 
place in our contemporary understanding of due process; it is 
time to recognize its role as a fundamental element of fair 
judicial practice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The promise of appeal is built into American popular culture. It 
is “the immemorial cry of every defeated litigant: ‘I’ll take it to the 
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Supreme Court!’ ”1 Both the criminal defendant who is wrongly 
convicted and the civil defendant facing a potentially bankrupting 
judgment hold on dearly to the promise of error correction in a higher 
court. Their lawyers may quickly instruct them that Supreme Court 
review is both discretionary and difficult to obtain, trying to refocus 
their hopes on a state or federal court of appeals.2 What even the 
lawyers may not know, however, is that appellate review is not 
constitutionally guaranteed; in some jurisdictions, the losing litigant 
may be forced to go without any review of the trial court’s verdict at 
all. This was the case for Massey Energy Company, which faced a 
quarter-billion-dollar verdict (the seventh-largest verdict nationwide 
in 2007) that was reviewed only by a single trial judge in West 
Virginia.3 It was also the case for Frank Billotti, who was found guilty 
of first-degree murder and sentenced to life in prison without the 
possibility of parole—and without the right of direct appeal.4 
This Article argues that the Supreme Court should explicitly 
recognize a constitutional right to appeal. Over the last century, both 
the federal and state judicial systems have increasingly relied on 
appellate remedies to protect individual rights, including the 
fundamental rights of life and liberty.5 In spite of the modern 
importance of such remedies, however, the Supreme Court has 
repeatedly declined to recognize a due process right to appeal in 
either civil or criminal cases. Instead, it has repeated nineteenth-
century dicta denying the right of appeal,6 and it has declined 
 
 1. James J. Kilpatrick, Supreme Court Load Grows Heavier, EVENING INDEP. (St. 
Petersburg, Fla.), Dec. 30, 1972, at 14-A. 
 2. See The Honorable Samuel A. Alito, Jr. et al., The Inaugural William French 
Smith Memorial Lecture: A Look at Supreme Court Advocacy with Justice Samuel Alito, 
35 PEPP. L. REV. 465, 477 (2008) (“Well, one thing that you cannot control is a client that 
is absolutely convinced that the decision below is wrong, and therefore they want to take it 
to the Supreme Court. You hear that expression, ‘We’ll take it all the way to the Supreme 
Court.’ Sometimes I can say to them, ‘I mean, literally, you have zero chance of having 
the Court grant certiorari in this case.’ ”). 
 3. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Cent. W. Va. Energy Co. v. Wheeling 
Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 555 U.S. 1045 (2008) (No. 08-218), 2008 WL 3884291, at *2. 
 4. Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1992). Billotti filed a habeas 
petition in federal court; the federal court found that West Virginia’s discretionary review 
procedures “comport[ed] with the requirements of due process,” and dismissed the case. 
Id. 
 5. See infra Part II.B. 
 6. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 31 & n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court’s “precedents . . . tend to support” the idea 
that “[s]tates are under no constitutional duty to provide for civil appeals”); Cobbledick v. 
United States, 309 U.S. 323, 324–25 (1940) (“[T]he right to a judgment from more than 
one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of justice . . . .”); McKane v. 
Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687–88 (1894) (“A review by an appellate court of the final 
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petitions for certiorari in both civil and criminal cases seeking to 
persuade the Court to reconsider that position.7 
The Supreme Court has been able to avoid ruling on the matter 
precisely because appellate remedies are nearly universal: the federal 
court system and forty-seven states provide—as a matter of state 
law—either a constitutional or statutory requirement for appeals as of 
right in both civil and criminal cases.8 Nevertheless, this high degree 
of state-level protection does not obviate the need for a constitutional 
remedy. Without the protection of an effective system of appellate 
review, there will continue to be parties who face significant 
deprivations of liberty or property without any guarantee of review by 
a higher court. Even if these cases are few in number, they are 
nonetheless important; the due process doctrine is, after all, meant to 
protect the unusual or rare case in which justice has been denied. As 
 
judgment in a criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused is convicted, 
. . . is not now a necessary element of due process of law.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Superior Highwall Miners, Inc. v. Frye, 130 S. Ct. 2354 (2010); Cent. 
W. Va. Energy Co., 555 U.S. 1045; NiSource, Inc. v. Estate of Tawney, 555 U.S. 1041 
(2008); Camden-Clark Mem’l Hosp. Corp. v. Boggs, 553 U.S. 1017 (2008); Mountain 
Enters., Inc. v. Fitch, 541 U.S. 989 (2004). On the criminal side, the Court denied 
certiorari petitions in Ratliff v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 815 (1995), and in Billotti, 507 U.S. 984. 
 8. See Marc M. Arkin, Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 503, 513–14 (1992). There are three states—New Hampshire, West 
Virginia, and Virginia—without a state constitutional or statutory provision for appeal as 
of right for criminal defendants. See Bundy v. Wilson, 815 F.2d 125, 128 (1st Cir. 1987). 
Two of these states (New Hampshire and West Virginia) have, within the last decade, 
adopted a court rule providing review of all appeals in the state supreme court. See N.H. 
SUP. CT. R. 3, available at http://www.courts.state.nh.us/rules/scr/scr-3.htm (“A 
mandatory appeal shall be accepted by the supreme court for review on the merits. A 
mandatory appeal is . . . an appeal from a final decision on the merits issued by a superior 
court . . . .”); W. VA. R. APP. P. 21 (clerk’s cmt.), available at 
http://www.courtswv.gov/legal-community/court-rules/appellate-procedure/pdfs/Revised-
Rules-of-Appellate-Procedure-FINAL.pdf. The New Hampshire rule, however, does note 
certain exceptions that do not constitute mandatory appeals such as “an appeal from a final 
decision on the merits issued in a sentence modification or suspension proceeding. N.H. 
SUP. CT. R. 3. Virginia does have an intermediate appellate court, but the court has 
discretionary review power over non-capital criminal cases, and provides appeals as of 
right only in limited categories of civil cases. General civil cases, by contrast, do not go to 
the intermediate court and are instead subject to discretionary review in the Virginia 
Supreme Court. See VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-4056(A) (2010); see also Bevel v. 
Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 789, 790 n.11 (Va. 2011) (“In criminal cases in Virginia, 
other than in cases where a sentence of death is imposed, the awarding of an appeal is 
discretionary and not a matter of right.”); L. Steven Emmert, Certiorari v. Error 
Correction: Which Is Which, and Why It Matters, VA. APP. NEWS & ANALYSIS (Feb. 3, 
2010), http://www.virginia-appeals.com/essay.aspx?id=155 (explaining that the Supreme 
Court of Virginia has discretionary review in most cases and noting that “you have to 
petition for a writ in criminal and traffic cases”). However, a “refusal” by the Supreme 
Court of Virginia is considered to be a decision on the merits. See Sheets v. Castle, 559 
S.E.2d 616, 619 (Va. 2002). 
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the Supreme Court has stated, “[E]xtreme cases are more likely to 
cross constitutional limits, requiring this Court’s intervention and 
formulation of objective standards. This is particularly true when due 
process is violated.”9 By recognizing a nondiscretionary constitutional 
right to appeal, the Court can ensure that liberty and property rights 
remain protected even in the unusual or uninviting case. 
Recognizing constitutional protection for appellate rights also 
prevents states from eliminating current statutory protections in an era 
of shrinking state budgets. Even before the current fiscal crisis, some 
scholars had advocated that states eliminate appeals as of right in 
order to save fiscal and administrative resources.10 That threat moved 
closer to becoming a reality in 2012, when a Virginia state lawmaker 
proposed eliminating the state’s intermediate appellate court in order 
to save eight million dollars a year.11 But when weighed against the 
risks of erroneous and uncorrectable rulings, the disruption of other 
procedures that depend on robust appellate rights, and diminished 
faith in the judicial system, the costs of guaranteed review are costs 
worth shouldering. 
This Article argues that a right to appeal protects both private 
litigants and the justice system as a whole.12 Part I examines the role 
 
 9. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868, 887 (2009). But see 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process, Judicial Review, and 
Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 373 (1993) (“For better or for worse, 
the [due process] doctrine reflects an implicit premise that individual fairness must often 
be sacrificed to the practical needs of the modern administrative state.”). 
 10. See Bernard G. Barrow, The Discretionary Appeal: A Cost Effective Tool of 
Appellate Justice, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 31, 31 (1988); Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for 
Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeal, 34 SW. L.J. 1151, 1156–57 (1981); 
Robert M. Parker & Ron Chapman, Jr., Accepting Reality: The Time for Adopting 
Discretionary Review in the Courts of Appeals Has Arrived, 50 SMU L. Rev. 573, 582 
(1997) (“Discretionary review would save time, money, and effort and would more 
honestly describe the system currently in place, a system in which courts exercise 
discretion behind a facade of deliberation.”). 
 11. Deeds: Kill the Court of Appeals, VLW BLOG (Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://valawyersweekly.com/vlwblog/2012/01/23/deeds-kill-the-court-of-appeals/ (noting 
that Senator Creigh Deeds introduced a bill to abolish the Virginia Court of Appeals). 
 12. This Article is the first to present a sustained argument in favor of an overarching 
right to appeal in civil and criminal cases. One scholar has proposed such a right in a short 
piece. See Henry G. Fins, Is the Right of Appeal Protected by the Fourteenth Amendment?, 
54 JUDICATURE 296, 297 (1971). Other scholars have argued explicitly for a right to 
appeal in criminal cases or in limited subsets of civil cases. See, e.g., Arkin, supra note 8, 
at 513, 520 (arguing for right in criminal cases); Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to 
Appeal (More or Less) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 69 (1985) (arguing for a right in 
limited categories of civil cases); James E. Lobsenz, A Constitutional Right to an Appeal: 
Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction, 8 U. PUGET SOUND L. 
REV. 375, 375 (1985) (arguing for right of appeal in criminal cases); Alex S. Ellerson, 
Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 373, 
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of appellate remedies in the American justice system, analyzes 
appellate outcomes and reversal rates, and explores the convergence 
of civil and criminal appellate remedies. Parts II and III make 
doctrinal arguments for the recognition of a constitutional right: Part 
II focuses on the private interests of individual litigants, applying the 
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test to weigh those private interests 
against the cost of appellate review, and Part III argues that doctrinal 
consistency necessitates the explicit recognition of a constitutional 
right to appeal, as the Court’s criminal and punitive damages 
doctrines have already implicitly recognized such a right. Part IV 
moves away from doctrine to examine the larger structure of the 
modern procedural system. It argues that even though Congress and 
the states may have voluntarily exceeded the requirements of 
constitutional due process when they first adopted broad appellate 
rights, the procedural system that has grown up around those rights 
relies on appellate remedies so broadly that they are now part of 
fundamental due process. Traditional procedural safeguards—such as 
the jury trial and the executive clemency process—may once have 
sufficiently protected due process rights. In the modern era, however, 
these procedures have diminished at the same time that reliance on 
appeals has grown; if appellate remedies are removed from the 
procedural framework, the system as a whole cannot provide 
adequate due process protection. Finally, Part V examines the 
expressive value of constitutionalizing appellate rights. It weighs the 
normative values inherent in constitutional recognition of a 
nondiscretionary right to appeal, and it analyzes the values that would 
be favored—as well as those that would be disfavored—by extending 
a nondiscretionary right of appeal. 
I. THE ROLE OF APPELLATE REMEDIES IN THE AMERICAN JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
Appellate remedies play a significant role in the American 
justice system.13 Legal scholars have identified a number of different 
 
382 (1991) (arguing for a right in criminal cases). Two prominent scholars have also filed 
an amicus brief arguing for a right to appeal in civil cases. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law 
Professors in Support of Petitioner at 1, Cent. W. Va. Energy Co., 555 U.S. 1045 (No. 08-
218), 2008 WL 4360892, at *1. Another has suggested that the Supreme Court should 
recognize a right to civil appeals in the context of a broader discussion of constitutional 
procedure. See John Leubsdorf, Constitutional Civil Procedure, 63 TEX. L. REV. 579, 580 
(1984). 
 13. This Article uses the term “appeal” in its broad modern sense “to designate any 
attempt to have a higher court review the factual or legal findings of a lower tribunal.” 
Joan Steinman, Appellate Courts as First Responders: The Constitutionality and Propriety 
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functions that a robust appellate system serves, including correcting 
legal and factual errors;14 encouraging the development and 
refinement of legal principles;15 increasing uniformity and 
standardization in the application of legal rules;16 and promoting 
respect for the rule of law.17 In criminal cases, appellate rights play an 
additional role in guarding against wrongful conviction of the 
innocent.18 
This Part examines the role of appellate remedies in the 
American justice system. It begins by analyzing appellate outcomes, 
including the rate of appeals, the rate of reversals, and the winners 
and losers of the appellate process. It continues by examining the 
intertwining of process and policy on appeal; specifically, it argues 
that although some people have advocated for differential treatment 
of civil and criminal appeals as a policy matter, the two spheres 
present the same process values. Treating the two spheres together 
allows a deeper focus on the procedural and systemic benefits of the 
appellate process that go beyond the question of who wins and who 
loses in a particular case. 
 
of Appellate Courts’ Resolving Issues in the First Instance, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1521, 1546 (2012) (citation omitted). 
 14. See Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49, 49 (2010) (“Most 
depictions of appellate courts suggest that they serve two core functions: the creation and 
refinement of law and the correction of error.”). 
 15. See PAUL D. CARRINGTON, DANIEL J. MEADOR, & MAURICE ROSENBERG, 
JUSTICE ON APPEAL 3 (1976) (“[A]ppellate courts are needed to announce, clarify, and 
harmonize the rules of decision employed by the legal system in which they serve.”); 
Oldfather, supra note 14, at 49 (noting that a function of appellate courts is “the creation 
and refinement of law”); see also Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Deciding When to Decide: 
How Appellate Procedure Distributes the Costs of Legal Change, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 
203, 214 (2011) (examining the “institutional dimension” of how courts handle changing 
legal doctrine through the appellate process). 
 16. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Appellate Review of Discovery Orders in 
Federal Court: A Suggested Approach for Handling Privilege Claims, 81 WASH. L. REV. 
733, 771 (2006); Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens on Appeal: The 
Case for Interlocutory Review, 18 SW. J. INT’L L. 445, 455 (2012) (“The classic remedy 
for inconsistent application of the law is appellate review.”). 
 17. See Michael Heise, Federal Criminal Appeals: A Brief Empirical Perspective, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 825, 827 (2009) (“Despite their comparative scarcity, appealed cases—far 
more than cases that settle or go to trial—form the basis of much of what many observers 
know about the legal system.”). 
 18. See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 MARQ. 
L. REV. 591, 591–92 (2009) (noting the role of criminal appellate courts in protecting 
against wrongful conviction). 
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A. Appellate Outcomes 
Appellate remedies are able to play a significant jurisprudential 
role precisely because of the near-universality of appellate rights. In 
federal court and in nearly every state, litigants who lose in the trial 
court are guaranteed one appeal as of right.19 In civil cases, not every 
losing party will avail itself of an appeal; researchers examining 
appellate outcomes have estimated that only approximately fifteen 
percent of state-court civil cases are appealed.20 Plaintiffs and 
defendants appealed trial-court judgments at a nearly equal rate.21 In 
criminal cases, defendants who plead guilty—especially to smaller 
crimes—are unlikely to appeal.22 However, almost every criminal 
defendant who loses at trial will have an incentive to file an appeal.23 
On appeal, civil defendants tend to do better than plaintiffs.24 
Overall, when ruling on the merits, state appellate courts affirmed the 
trial court verdict in about two-thirds of all cases and reversed or 
modified the judgment in nearly one-third of the cases.25 When 
broken down by type of appellant, however, success rates diverge 
significantly; forty-two percent of trial court decisions favoring 
plaintiffs were reversed or modified, as compared to only twenty-one 
 
 19. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 513–14. 
 20. See THOMAS H. COHEN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, NCJ 212979, APPEALS FROM GENERAL CIVIL TRIALS IN 46 LARGE COUNTIES, 
2001–2005, at 2 (2006). 
 21. See id. at 3 (noting that forty-eight percent of appeals were filed by plaintiffs and 
fifty-two percent by defendants). 
 22. See Heise, supra note 17, at 832 (“[P]lea bargains are rarely reviewed for error.”); 
Jenny Roberts, Why Misdemeanors Matter: Defining Effective Advocacy in the Lower 
Criminal Courts, 45 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 277, 320 (2011) (“[O]nly a small percentage of 
individuals convicted of a misdemeanor file an appeal or seek other post-conviction 
review of counsel’s effectiveness.”); see also JOHN SCALIA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NCJ 185055, FEDERAL CRIMINAL APPEALS, 1999 
WITH TRENDS 1985–1999, at 1, 3 (2001), 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fca99.pdf (noting that defendants appealed sixteen 
out of every 100 federal court convictions overall, but only five per 100 in misdemeanor 
cases). 
 23. See, e.g., Heise, supra note 17, at 829 (“Because pursuing a criminal appeal is 
essentially free—or more accurately, because criminal appellants are not forced to 
internalize the full costs of their appeal—there is little incentive not to appeal.”); J. Clark 
Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 433, 445 n.43 
(1994) (“In 1991-92, there were 152 appeals from every 100 convictions after contested 
trials. A significant number of appeals follow guilty pleas, which explains how 152 
appeals follow 100 convictions after contested trials.” (citations omitted)). 
 24. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: 
Defendants’ Advantage, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 125, 125 (2001) (“Defendants appealing 
their losses after trial by jury obtain reversals at a 31% rate, while losing plaintiffs succeed 
in only 13% of their appeals from jury trials.”). 
 25. See COHEN, supra note 20, at 1. 
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percent of decisions favoring defendants.26 Large verdicts were 
especially likely to be overturned; “nearly half (48%) of appeals from 
trials with damage awards of over $1 million were reversed or 
modified by the appellate courts,” while only thirty-five percent of 
cases with a damage award between $1 and $100,000 were 
overturned on appeal.27 In federal court, verdicts favorable to 
plaintiffs were reversed in one-third of appeals, and verdicts favorable 
to defendants were reversed in only twelve percent of cases.28 
Appeals from criminal convictions arise in a very different 
landscape than civil appeals. First, the prevalence of plea bargaining 
filters those cases which go through the trial process.29 Second, 
generally only the convicted defendant has a possible appellate 
remedy, as double jeopardy protections prevent the government from 
appealing an acquittal.30 Those defendants who are convicted at trial 
have incentive to appeal, and indigent defendants are provided 
publicly appointed counsel.31 Thus, the cases eligible for appeal may 
differ from the larger universe of criminal cases in two different—and 
potentially opposing—respects. At the pretrial stage, the defendant 
who chooses to go to trial rather than accept a plea bargain is likely to 
have a relatively stronger case. After trial, however, a losing 
defendant has a strong incentive to appeal even a case that has proven 
quite weak.32 
Most criminal convictions are affirmed on appeal. In federal 
court, the affirmance rate is approximately seventy percent, though 
there are significant differences among federal circuits.33 In state 
 
 26. See id. at 5. 
 27. Id. at 6. 
 28. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Plaintiphobia in the Appellate 
Courts: Civil Rights Really Do Differ from Negotiable Instruments, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 
947, 947. 
 29. See Heise, supra note 17, at 827 (“Selection effects and case stream filtering 
work in a manner that most often reduces the number of criminal appeals likely to be 
reversed.”); see also Editorial, Trial Judge to Appeals Court: Review Me, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 17, 2012, at A24 (“[A] vast majority of criminal cases—97 percent of federal cases, 
94 percent of state cases—are resolved by guilty pleas.”). 
 30. See Heise, supra note 17, at 830–31 (“In the civil context, either party has the 
ability to appeal. In the criminal context, however, constitutional double jeopardy 
protections for criminal defendants generally afford defendants only with the opportunity 
to appeal an adverse trial judgment.”). 
 31. See id. at 829. 
 32. See id. (“Because pursuing a criminal appeal is essentially free—or, more 
accurately, because criminal appellants are not forced to internalize the full costs of their 
appeal—there is little incentive not to appeal.”).  
 33. See id. at 833 (“Although the overall average nationwide affirmance rate for 2006 
criminal appeals was 68.5%, across the nation’s twelve federal circuits affirmance rates 
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court, the affirmance rate varies between seventy and eighty percent.34 
When appellate courts reverse a conviction, they are much more 
likely to order a retrial than to acquit the defendant entirely.35 Outlier 
sentences—both the shortest and the longest—are more likely to be 
reversed on appeal than mid-range sentences, though defendants 
facing longer sentences are less likely to win complete acquittal on 
appeal than those facing shorter ones.36 
B.  The False Dichotomy Between Civil and Criminal Appeals 
Arguments in favor of extending constitutional protection to 
appellate remedies have typically focused either on criminal or civil 
appeals, rather than supporting a generalized appellate remedy.37 But 
while some policy reasons may apply in one sphere and not the other, 
the process values supporting broad appellate remedies are more alike 
than different. 
Those who argue in favor of extending constitutional protections 
only to civil appeals point out the extensive safeguards already 
present in criminal cases.38 For example, criminal prosecutions must 
be proven beyond a reasonable doubt; the indigent criminal defendant 
is entitled to appointed counsel; and criminal juries may acquit 
without being subject to review.39 In many states, juries can convict 
 
ranged from a low of 49.3% (D.C. Circuit) to a high of 85.1% (Eleventh Circuit). Reversal 
rates ranged from 5.7% to 20.5%.”). 
 34. See id. at 830; see also JOY A. CHAPPER & ROGER A. HANSON, NAT’L CTR. FOR 
STATE COURTS, UNDERSTANDING REVERSIBLE ERROR IN CRIMINAL APPEALS 5 (1989) 
(“[T]he overall affirmance rate for [appellate courts in five states] is 79.4%. Four of the 
courts (all but Rhode Island) are within plus-or-minus two percentage points of that figure 
(78.6, 79.3, 79.3, and 81.7%); Rhode Island’s affirmance rate was 70.8%.”).  
 35. CHAPPER & HANSON, supra note 34, at 5 (“Acquittals constituted only 1.9% of 
all appeals and only 9.4% of all nonaffirmances or ‘winners.’ In no jurisdiction did 
acquittals occur in as many as 4% of all appeals. A remand with the possibility of retrial 
was more likely—6.6% of all appeals and 31.9% of all winners.”). 
 36. See id. at 6 (“ ‘Winning big’ (i.e., an acquittal or a new trial) occurs most 
frequently in appeals with the least serious sentence; appeals involving the longest 
sentences show the highest percentage of ‘winning little’ (i.e., resentencing or other 
modification).”). 
 37. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 12, at 1, 2008 WL 4360892, at *1 (focusing on civil appeals); Arkin, supra note 8, at 
513 (focusing on criminal appeals). 
 38. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 6–7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *6–7. 
 39. See id. at 5–7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *5–7; see also Lavett v. People, 7 Cow. 339, 
343 (N.Y. 1827) (“Criminal proceedings have thrown around the innocent so many guards 
that the writ of error is almost useless.”); Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (1 Call) 461, 
469 (1803) (stating that some safeguards of defendants in criminal cases include the 
“power of the jury to acquit in a criminal case, the pardoning power of the executive, and 
the objection to great delays in the execution of the criminal law”). 
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only though unanimous agreement, and the executive branch 
generally possesses the power to grant clemency.40 As a result, some 
have concluded that criminal outcomes are protected by sufficient 
procedural safeguards, and that “guaranteed access to postjudgment 
review” is therefore needed only in civil cases.41 This view is also 
grounded in long-standing practices, as the federal system and some 
states historically offered greater appellate remedies in the civil 
sphere than in the criminal sphere.42 This divergence continues today 
in Virginia, where parties can appeal as of right in civil cases 
involving domestic relations, workers’ compensation, and 
administrative law cases—but have only a discretionary appeal in 
noncapital criminal cases.43 
In spite of the historically greater protection for civil appeals, 
some have argued that it is more important to extend appellate 
protection to criminal cases than civil ones.44 Criminal appeals protect 
against the erroneous deprivation of liberty and, in capital cases, 
against the erroneous deprivation of life.45 As one scholar has pointed 
out, it is “generally accepted as a part of American social philosophy 
that the right to liberty is as great as, if not greater than, the right of 
property.”46 As a result, some scholars have argued that it violates the 
constitutional guarantee of equal protection to allow civil appeals as 
of right without extending the same protection to criminal appeals.47 
 
 40. See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra note 12, 
at 5–6, 2008 WL 4360892, at *5–6.  
 41. Id. at 7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7. 
 42. See, e.g., Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903) (“Neither is the right of 
appeal essential to due process of law. In nearly every State are statutes giving, in criminal 
cases of a minor nature, a single trial, without any right of review . . . . In civil cases a 
common rule is that the amount in controversy limits the entire litigation to one court, yet 
there was never any serious question that in these cases due process of law was granted.”); 
Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272, 272 (1895) (noting that, at the time the case was 
decided, New Jersey law allowed appeals as of right in non-capital cases but allowed only 
a discretionary “writ of grace” in capital cases). 
 43. VA. CODE ANN. § 17.1-405 (2010); see also Bevel v. Commonwealth, 717 S.E.2d 
789, 790 n.1 (Va. 2011) (“In criminal cases in Virginia, other than in cases where a 
sentence of death is imposed, the awarding of an appeal is discretionary and not a matter 
of right.”); Robert P. Davidow & Damon W.D. Wright, Virginia’s Discriminatory 
Treatment of Criminal Appeals: Some Constitutional and Policy Considerations, 6 GEO. 
MASON U. C.R. L.J. 1, 5–6 (1996). 
 44. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 521–24; Lobsenz, supra note 12, at 389. 
 45. See Lobsenz, supra note 12, at 383 (arguing that the “risk of convicting the 
innocent” justifies constitutional protection of criminal appeals). 
 46. Fins, supra note 12, at 297. 
 47. Davidow & Wright, supra note 43, at 33–34 (arguing that Virginia’s appellate 
statutes “placed civil litigants in a ‘preferred appellate position’ ” in relation to that of 
criminal defendants). 
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Others have argued that the complexity of constitutional criminal 
procedure makes appellate remedies particularly important within the 
criminal justice system.48 
But while most commentators have argued for expanded 
protection of either civil or criminal appeals, the justifications that 
they cite are largely the same in both spheres. Both civil and criminal 
appeals protect against arbitrary or erroneous application of the law; 
both promote the development and standardization of legal doctrine; 
and both assist in standardizing outcomes for similarly situated 
litigants.49 The risks of withholding appellate remedies are also more 
similar than different. On the criminal side, scholars have pointed out 
that because of the high error rate at trial, appeals are critical to 
maintaining institutional legitimacy: “The degree of error reported, if 
left uncorrected because of the elimination of a right of appeal that is 
merely statutory, would be intolerably high and would delegitimate 
any punishment imposed through such an adjudicatory process.”50 
Others have made a similar legitimacy argument in support of civil 
appeals: 
As the framers of the Constitution recognized, the absence of a 
guaranteed appeal in cases involving substantial deprivations of 
property would undermine confidence in the judicial system; 
“were there no appeal [guaranteed for civil judgments], every 
man would have reason to complain, especially when a final 
judgment, in an inferior court, should affect property to a large 
amount.”51 
Given the similar roles played by civil and criminal appeals, it is 
surprising that some would recommend treating them differently. This 
inconsistent treatment makes more sense, however, when viewed in 
terms of policy rather than doctrine. In the criminal justice system, 
 
 48. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 574–76. 
 49. See Barbara B. Crabb, In Defense of Direct Appeals: A Further Reply to 
Professor Chemerinsky, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 137, 138 (1997) (“Americans continue to 
believe in the right of appeal, both as a means of giving a second chance to be heard, albeit 
in limited fashion, thus providing a greater sense of fair treatment, and for its normative 
function, in essence reining in the outliers among the lower courts, with the result that 
litigants can expect reasonably uniform and consistent treatment within the courts of any 
particular jurisdiction.”). 
 50. Rosanna Cavallaro, Better Off Dead: Abatement, Innocence, and the Evolving 
Right of Appeal, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 943, 980 (2002). 
 51. Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 
7–8, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7–8 (quoting NOAH WEBSTER, EXAMINATION INTO THE 
LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS 
ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY 
THE PEOPLE, 1787–1788, at 53 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1968) (1888)). 
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robust appellate remedies aid criminal defendants—a group with very 
little political support.52 Those who do support expanded protections 
for criminal defendants tend to fall nearer to the left side of the 
political spectrum.53 In civil cases, however, support for a robust 
system of appellate review skews toward the right: because large civil 
verdicts are more likely to be reversed on appeal, corporate 
defendants and tort reform groups are more likely to support civil 
appellate rights.54 The effect of judicial elections may further solidify 
these positions, as the public is likely to choose judges whose views 
conform to those of the electorate.55 
Thus, when people advocate for expanded appellate process, 
they may advocate for that expanded process only in a limited number 
of cases: only in death penalty cases, or only in felony cases, or only 
in civil cases, or only in civil cases where punitive damages have 
been awarded. Such a strategy may backfire, however, if it limits the 
 
 52. See Adam M. Gershowitz, Note, The Supreme Court’s Backwards 
Proportionality Jurisprudence: Comparing Judicial Review of Excessive Criminal 
Punishments and Excessive Punitive Damages Awards, 86 VA. L. REV. 1249, 1300 (2000) 
(“[L]egislatures often do not consider the interests of criminal defendants. In a ‘tough on 
crime’ political world, politicians do not win elections unless they announce that they will 
punish criminals severely.”); see also Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) 
(Stewart, J., concurring) (“[T]he Constitution extends less procedural protection to an 
imprisoned human being than is required to test the propriety of garnishing a commercial 
bank account, the custody of a refrigerator, the temporary suspension of a public school 
student, or the suspension of a driver’s license.” (citations omitted)). 
 53. See, e.g., Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 9, 34 (2001) (“In 
criminal cases, Democratic judges generally are more sympathetic to criminal defendants, 
while Republicans tend to favor prosecution and law enforcement.”); William H. 
Rehnquist, Who Writes Decisions of the Supreme Court?, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., 
Dec. 13, 1957, at 74, 75, available at 
http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/2008/12/09/william-rehnquist-writes-in-1957-on-
supreme-court-law-clerks-influence (characterizing Supreme Court clerks as taking 
“left[ist]” positions that showed “extreme solicitude for the claims of Communists and 
other criminal defendants”). 
 54. Cf. Richie Heath, Their View: Personal Attacks Aimed at Protecting Profits, Not 
Justice, W. VA. REC. (May 18, 2011, 1:00 PM), http://wvrecord.com/arguments/235596-
their-view-personal-attacks-aimed-at-protecting-profits-not-justice (arguing that the West 
Virginia Association for Justice’s primary motive for objecting to the creation of a state 
intermediate court of appeals and to the guarantee of appeals as of right in civil cases is 
that its members—personal injury lawyers—benefit from the state’s restrictive appeals 
process, using it to extort lucrative settlements from businesses, and noting that employers 
are leaving the state to escape the inhospitable legal environment). 
 55. Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 169, 171 (2009) (“Judges facing Republican retention agents [i.e., a 
Republican electorate] tend to vote in accord with standard Republican policy: they are 
more likely to vote for businesses over individuals, for employers in labor disputes, for 
doctors and hospitals in medical malpractice disputes, for businesses in products liability 
cases, for original defendants in torts cases, and against criminals in criminal appeals. The 
mirror image applies for judges facing retention decisions by Democrats.”). 
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political constituency that could support the expansion of appellate 
rights and reduces the possibility of coalition building; members of 
the electorate who support greater appellate rights in cases involving 
punitive damages, for example, may be different from those who 
support greater appellate rights for criminal defendants. 
This effect may explain the difficulty faced in West Virginia, 
where tort reform groups have supported, and plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have opposed, a guaranteed right to appeal.56 Because the measure 
was presented as an outlet to review high punitive damage awards, it 
gained traction only with those who supported damage limitations as 
a policy matter.57 Although the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted 
new rules for 2011 that require disposition on the merits, a proposal to 
create an intermediate court of appeals stalled in the state 
legislature.58 
If different policy preferences account for people’s varying 
views about the importance of civil and criminal appeals, then 
considering the civil and criminal spheres together may overcome a 
narrow political emphasis.59 At the individual level, such unification 
 
 56. See Heath, supra note 54. 
 57. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 12, at 7–8, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7–8 (limiting the argument to civil cases); Heath, 
supra note 54 (noting the difference in political support). 
 58. See Andrea Lannom, Appeals Declining but Some Still Want Intermediate Court, 
ST. J. (W. Va.), Feb. 10, 2012, at 23 (quoting supporters of the creation of an intermediate 
court as stating that such a court would “increase review of circuit court decisions and to 
aid in the development of West Virginia law,” and quoting opponents of the measure who 
state that it would merely “create a new layer of judges that the richest companies in West 
Virginia can appoint themselves”). 
 59. When advocating that civil and criminal appeals be considered together, this 
Article refers only to direct appeals, as these provide the closest analogy between the civil 
and criminal spheres. On the criminal side, however, there are other types of post-trial 
judicial review that are beyond the scope of this Article, most notably habeas corpus 
review. See Christopher M. Johnson, Post-Trial Judicial Review of Criminal Convictions: 
A Comparative Study of the United States and Finland, 64 ME. L. REV. 425, 428 (2012) 
(noting that the American judicial system divides “ ‘post-trial judicial review’ into three 
phases for state prisoners (direct appeal, state post-conviction review or collateral attack, 
and federal habeas corpus), and two phases for federal prisoners (direct appeal and habeas 
corpus)”). As others have noted, the relief offered through collateral review in a habeas 
proceeding does not substitute for direct appellate review. See, e.g., Russell M. Coombs, A 
Third Parallel Primrose Path: The Supreme Court’s Repeated, Unexplained, and Still 
Growing Regulation of State Courts’ Criminal Appeals, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 541, 626 
(“[C]onstitutional doctrine applicable to a case is more likely to favor the defendant in a 
state appellate court than in a federal habeas court. . . . [The Supreme Court] requires that 
defendants challenging their convictions or sentences on direct appeal in state courts 
receive the benefit of new rules of federal constitutional law that favor them. In contrast, 
the Supreme Court has held that, perhaps with narrow exceptions, state prisoners seeking 
habeas relief in federal courts do not receive that benefit.”). 
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allows for consistency between the two spheres in cases where the 
remedies overlap; punitive damages can serve a punishment purpose 
in civil litigation, and monetary restitution may be ordered in a 
criminal case. In such cases, “comparable deprivations should 
generally require a comparable degree of process. . . . The mere label 
of ‘criminal’ or ‘civil’ should not be determinative of due process 
rights that attach when the individual is threatened with virtually the 
same harm in either instance.”60 
Even when civil and criminal remedies play different roles, 
taking a unified approach to civil and criminal appeals allows the 
discussion to focus on the systemic effects of changed processes 
rather than the policy effects of changed outcomes.61 Such systemic 
changes will have real policy outcomes, but these policy outcomes are 
not limited to the immediate effect of who wins and who loses in a 
particular case. Instead, policy outcomes extend to the population at 
large: those who observe the justice system, those who participate in 
it, and those who consider participating in it—for example, by 
choosing between litigation and arbitration, by including forum 
selection clauses in contracts, and even by choosing where to locate a 
business.62 
II. DUE PROCESS PROTECTION FOR APPELLATE REMEDIES 
The Supreme Court has repeatedly disclaimed the existence of 
constitutional protection for either criminal or civil appeals.63 Because 
 
 60. Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 57–58 (2006). 
 61. See Issachar Rosen-Zvi & Talia Fisher, Overcoming Procedural Boundaries, 94 
VA. L. REV. 79, 86 (2008) (“[T]o the extent that detaching the two spheres is justified in 
substance, a parallel split in procedure is not necessarily entailed. . . . [D]issociating 
substantive civil and criminal law from procedure would better serve the goals of both.”). 
 62. See, e.g., Justin Anderson, Bill Lays Out Intermediate Appellate Courts, W. VA. 
REC. (April 2, 2009, 11:30 AM), http://www.wvrecord.com/news/218275-bill-lays-out-
intermediate-appellate-courts (noting that Chesapeake Energy removed hundreds of jobs 
from West Virginia after the state supreme court denied appellate review of a $400 million 
verdict against it). 
 63. See M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 131 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(acknowledging the Court’s “oft-affirmed view that due process does not oblige States to 
provide for any appeal, even from a criminal conviction”); Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 
481 U.S. 1, 31 n.4 (1987) (Stevens, J., concurring) (disclaiming constitutional protection 
for civil appeals); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (“It is true that a State is not 
required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate courts or a right to appellate 
review at all.”); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940) (“[T]he right to a 
judgment from more than one court is a matter of grace and not a necessary ingredient of 
justice . . . .”); Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U.S. 505, 508 (1903) (“Neither is the right of 
appeal essential to due process of law. In nearly every state are statutes giving, in criminal 
cases of a minor nature, a single trial, without any right of review. . . . In civil cases a 
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most jurisdictions granted a statutory right of appeal, however, these 
statements were almost always dicta; the Court has only rarely been 
faced with cases in which all appellate review was denied. On the 
criminal side, the issue has been raised in at least two certiorari 
petitions in recent decades;64 however, the last time that the Supreme 
Court accepted such a case was in 1895, in Andrews v. Swartz.65 At 
that time, New Jersey law allowed an appeal as of right in non-capital 
cases but allowed only a discretionary “writ of grace” in capital 
cases.66 After the defendant was convicted of murder in the New 
Jersey state court and sentenced to death, the State denied his 
application for a writ of error.67 The defendant then sought a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal court, arguing that New Jersey’s 
discretionary appeal statute violated the U.S. Constitution.68 The 
Supreme Court upheld the denial of habeas relief, repeating its earlier 
words from McKane v. Durston69: 
A review by an appellate court of the final judgment in a 
criminal case, however grave the offence of which the accused 
is convicted, was not at common law and is not now a 
necessary element of due process of law. It is wholly within the 
discretion of the State to allow or not to allow such a review. It 
is, therefore clear that the right of appeal may be accorded by 
the State to the accused upon such terms as in its wisdom may 
be proper; and whether an appeal should be allowed, and if so, 
under what circumstances or on what conditions, are matters 
for each State to determine for itself.70 
 
common rule is that the amount in controversy limits the entire litigation to one court, yet 
there was never any serious question that in these cases due process of law was granted.”); 
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687–88 (1894) (disclaiming constitutional protection 
for criminal appeals). 
 64. The Court denied at least two petitions for certiorari that explicitly raised the 
issue. See Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 114 (4th Cir. 1992) (originating in West 
Virginia), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 984 (1993); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4–7, Ratliff 
v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 815 (1995) (No. 94-1982). 
 65. 156 U.S. 272, 273 (1895). 
 66. See id. at 272. 
 67. Id. at 272–73. The principal ground for the defendant’s attempted appeal was that 
“all persons of his race and color were excluded in the drawing of the grand jury which 
indicted him” and from the petit jury hearing his case; although there were African-
American citizens “qualified in all respects to act both as jurors and grand jurors,” they 
“were purposely excluded, and always have been, by the sheriff of Warren county.” Id. at 
273. 
 68. Id. at 273–75. 
 69. 153 U.S. 684 (1894). 
 70. Andrews, 156 U.S. at 275 (quoting McKane, 153 U.S. at 687–88). 
CITE AS 91 N.C. L. REV. 1219 
2013] THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 1235 
 
Much can change over the course of a century, however, and 
nearly ninety years later two members of the Supreme Court 
expressed doubt that the denial of appellate review would be upheld 
in the modern era. In a case challenging the quality of appellate 
representation in a criminal appeal, Justice Brennan, in a dissent 
joined by Justice Marshall, argued that if the Court were directly 
presented with a case in which a criminal defendant had been denied 
the right to appeal altogether, he would “have little doubt that we 
would decide that a State must afford at least some opportunity for 
review of convictions, whether through the familiar mechanism of 
appeal or through some form of collateral proceeding.”71 He added 
that “[t]here are few, if any, situations in our system of justice in 
which a single judge is given unreviewable discretion over matters 
concerning a person’s liberty or property.”72 
Justice Brennan’s reference to “liberty or property” seems to 
imply that his due process rationale would extend to both civil and 
criminal cases. In recent years, however, the Supreme Court has, on at 
least seven separate occasions, declined an invitation to consider the 
question of constitutional protection for appellate rights.73 Five of the 
seven were civil cases arising in West Virginia,74 where the state lacks 
an intermediate appellate court and had an overburdened state 
supreme court with the power of discretionary review.75 Between 
1999 and 2008, the West Virginia Supreme Court refused to hear 
sixty-nine percent of civil appeals and eighty-four percent of criminal 
appeals, leaving the losing party with no appeal from the trial court’s 
judgment.76 As a result, some very large civil cases were denied 
appellate review entirely; in one case, a $220 million verdict was 
 
 71. Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 756 n.1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 72. Id. 
 73. On the civil side, the Court denied certiorari petitions in Superior Highwall 
Miners, Inc. v. Frye, 130 S. Ct. 2354 (2010); Camden-Clark Hospital Corp. v. Boggs, 553 
U.S. 1017 (2008); NiSource, Inc. v. Estate of Tawney, 555 U.S. 1041 (2008); Central West 
Virginia Energy Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 555 U.S. 1045 (2008); and 
Mountain Enterprises, Inc. v. Fitch, 541 U.S. 989 (2004). On the criminal side, the Court 
denied certiorari petitions in Ratliff v. Virginia, 516 U.S. 815 (1995), and Billotti v. 
Legursky, 507 U.S. 984 (1993).  
 74. See supra note 73. 
 75. See Lannom, supra note 58, at 23; Anderson, supra note 62. In December 2010, 
the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted new appellate rules providing for a ruling on 
each appeal. See W. VA. R. APP. P. 21 clerk’s cmt. Rulings may be made by non-
precedential memorandum opinions. Id. 
 76. W. VA. PUB. DEFENDER SERV., THE NEED FOR AN INTERMEDIATE COURT OF 
APPEALS IN WEST VIRGINIA WITH AN APPEAL OF RIGHT IN CRIMINAL CASES 5 (2009), 
available at http://www.wvpds.org/PDS.intermediate%20court%20Proposal%20and 
%20Argument.pdf. 
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denied appellate review, and in another case a $400 million verdict 
was similarly denied review.77 Two remaining cases were both 
criminal convictions, one of which arose in West Virginia and the 
other in Virginia, which provides only discretionary review for most 
criminal convictions.78 
The question of constitutional protection for appellate rights will 
likely continue to arise in both civil and criminal cases until the 
Supreme Court agrees to address the issue. This Part examines 
possible bases for such a right. It first looks at the historical protection 
for appellate remedies and concludes that although some scholars 
have argued that historical practice supports the inclusion of appellate 
remedies within an originalist conception of due process, the evidence 
to support that position is not strong enough to be likely to carry the 
day with the Supreme Court. This Part then examines the role of 
contemporary practice in the due process calculus, and determines 
that there is a stronger argument for considering contemporary 
practice in the due process analysis, given how interwoven appellate 
remedies have become in both the civil and criminal justice systems. 
Finally, using contemporary practice, this Part analyzes protection for 
appeals as of right under the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test. 
A. Limited Historical Protection for Appellate Remedies 
Almost every legal system has provided for a second level of 
review in some situations. As one scholar has pointed out, “The 
underlying sentiment that there is (or must be) a higher authority 
which may be consulted to correct injustice has been ingrained in 
formal, governmental dispute-resolution systems throughout recorded 
history.”79 Thus, while ancient procedures do not match modern ones, 
there is at least some historical support for a right of appeal. The 
extent of this support, however, is less than clear; “[n]o part of the 
history of United States courts presents such a tangle of detail as does 
the handling of appeals.”80 
On the civil side, scholars have argued that appellate remedies 
were part of the due process rights recognized either at common law 
 
 77. Adam Liptak, U.S. Supreme Court Is Asked to Fix Troubled West Virginia Justice 
System, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008, at A41. 
 78. See Davidow & Wright, supra note 43, at 5. 
 79. J. Clark Kelso, A Report on the California Appellate System, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 
433, 433 (1994). 
 80. Mary Sarah Bilder, The Origin of the Appeal in America, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 913, 
918 (1997) (quoting JAMES WILLIAM HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE 
LAW MAKERS 101 (1950)). 
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or at least by 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.81 
They have rested this argument on the fact that the “writ of error,” 
which facilitated the correction of legal error by a higher court, was 
allowed “as a matter of right” under English common law.82 The term 
“appeal” was primarily used on the equity side, and referred to review 
of factual matters rather than being limited to legal error.83 In criminal 
cases, however, review was much more limited, and, somewhat 
counterintuitively, was more readily available in the least serious 
criminal cases than in the most serious.84 Review was provided as of 
right in misdemeanor cases, as long as “the defendant made a 
showing to the attorney-general of sufficient probable cause,” but, in 
capital cases (like the New Jersey case discussed above85), “such a 
writ was granted only upon the express consent of the attorney-
general, which was a matter of grace.”86 
In the early days of the United States, the right to appellate 
review was significantly limited. There was no right of review for 
criminal convictions in federal cases until 1879.87 On the civil side, an 
appeal as of right was more common. The federal judiciary statute 
 
 81. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Petitioner, supra 
note 12, at 7–8, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7–8 (tracing back to colonial times the sentiment 
that guaranteed appeals for civil litigants were essential to confidence in the judicial 
system). 
 82. David Rossman, “Were There No Appeal”: The History of Review in American 
Criminal Courts, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 518, 541 (1990); see also Gasperini v. 
Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 452 (1996) (“At common law, review of 
judgments was had only on writ of error, limited to questions of law.”). 
 83. See Bilder, supra note 80, at 914 (“The legal procedure known as ‘the appeal’ did 
not refer to what we now think of as an ‘appeal’—the correction by a higher court of 
errors of law made by a lower court. Instead, the ‘appeal’ referred to a procedure under 
which a higher tribunal could completely and broadly rehear and redecide not only the 
law, but also the entire facts of a case.”); James E. Pfander, Marbury, Original 
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court’s Supervisory Powers, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1515, 
1570 (2001) (“Both appeals from proceedings in equity and admiralty, and writs of error 
to secure review of judgments at common law, were available to appellants and petitioners 
in error as a matter of right.”). 
 84. Until the 1700s, any review in criminal cases was allowed only ex gratia, as a 
matter of grace and discretion by the Crown. In the eighteenth century, however, review in 
minor cases was delegated to the courts and allowed as of right. R. v. Wilkes (1770), 4 
Burr. 2527, 98 Eng. Rep. 327, 339 (K.B.). In more serious cases of treason and felony, 
however, review remained available only by permission of the Crown. In these cases, the 
defendant was said to have “forfeited all he has to the Crown,” and the sovereign could 
therefore “exercise his pleasure whether or not to give it back.” See 2 JOEL PRENTISS 
BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1362, at 1176–77 (2d ed. 1913). 
 85. See supra note 65. 
 86. Rossman, supra note 82, at 541. 
 87. Fins, supra note 12, at 296. (“[T]he remedy of appeal to a reviewing court 
developed very slowly. . . . [F]rom 1789 to 1879, a period of 90 years, a person who was 
convicted criminally by a federal court had no right of review.”). 
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incorporated such a right, but only in cases meeting an amount in 
controversy requirement.88 Not all states extended such appeal 
rights.89 Some states were slow to develop an appellate court system.90 
Others who had offered appeals as of right for civil cases at the time 
of their founding subsequently eliminated that right when later faced 
with crowded dockets.91 While there was greater protection at 
common law for appellate review in civil cases than in criminal ones, 
this preference did not take root in every state; for example, Louisiana 
constitutionalized a right to criminal appeals in 1845, specifying at 
the time that the state supreme court should provide them “preference 
over civil cases.”92 Thus, while the historical argument for due 
process protection is stronger for civil appeals than for criminal 
appeals, historical practice is by no means clear. This lack of clarity, 
combined with the Supreme Court’s own refusal to extend due 
process protection to the right of appeal suggests that the Court will 
be unlikely to locate such a right in an originalist conception of 
historical practice. 
B.  The Evolution of Due Process 
However, even if the Supreme Court is unpersuaded that 
historical practice demonstrates a due process protection of appellate 
remedies, it may nevertheless decide to extend such a right in light of 
modern practice. As one legal scholar has noted, “[W]hen it comes to 
what types of ‘procedures’ are ‘due,’ almost no one embraces 
 
 88. See Judith Resnik, Precluding Appeals, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 606 & n.22 
(1985). 
 89. See Rossman, supra note 82, at 522 (noting that the First Judiciary Act in 1789 
permitted writs of error in civil cases exceeding $2,000 in value, but “made no explicit 
provision for writs of error in criminal cases”); see also James E. Pfander, Jurisdiction-
Stripping and the Supreme Court’s Power to Supervise Inferior Tribunals, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 1433, 1461–62 (2000) (noting that although “the scope of review differed,” for the 
appeal in equity and the writ of error at common law, “both forms of appellate review 
were available as a matter of right and did not depend on the exercise of equitable 
discretion by the superior court,” leading to the creation of “a set of geographically 
convenient inferior federal tribunals in order to avoid the necessity of appeals to the 
distant and expensive Supreme Court in every case”). 
 90. Rossman, supra note 82, at 543 (noting that Georgia did not establish a state 
supreme court until 1848). 
 91. See Meredith R. Miller, A Picture of the New York Court of Appeals at the Time 
of Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 28 PACE L. REV. 357, 372 (2008) (noting that in 
New York, “with the court’s docket still overburdened, the legislature eliminated appeals 
as of right in most civil cases, effective on June 1, 1917”). 
 92. Jeremiah E. Goulka, The First Constitutional Right to Criminal Appeal: 
Louisiana’s Constitution of 1845 and the Clash of the Common Law and Natural Law 
Traditions, 17 TUL. EUR. & CIV. L.F. 151, 195 (2002). 
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originalist methods of interpretation.”93 Instead, most observers agree 
that the specific requisites of due process can and will change over 
time, even, on occasion, doing so “exceedingly quickly.”94 The 
Supreme Court itself has written that “[d]ue process, as this Court 
often has said, is a flexible concept that varies with the particular 
situation.”95 
Given the flexibility of the due process analysis, the Court may 
well be persuaded that even if the right to appeal in state court was 
not considered to be an integral part of due process in 1868, it has 
certainly become one by the current time. In describing the 
importance of an appellate remedy in the modern system, observers 
have pointed out that “[a]lthough its origins are neither constitutional 
nor ancient, the right has become, in a word, sacrosanct.”96 In modern 
American practice, “the availability of review by a ‘multi judge’ 
appellate tribunal [has become] an essential safeguard.”97 
International law likewise recognizes the importance of appellate 
remedies; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
provides that “[e]veryone convicted of a crime shall have the right to 
his conviction and sentence being reviewed by a higher tribunal 
according to law.”98 
The Supreme Court has not provided a bright-line rule for 
determining “when procedures that satisfied the demands of due 
process in the past may be rendered unconstitutional by changes in 
the facts and circumstances.”99 In the personal jurisdiction context, 
the Court has stated that the requirements of due process “can be as 
readily offended by the perpetuation of ancient forms that are no 
 
 93. Lawrence Rosenthal, Does Due Process Have an Original Meaning? On 
Originalism, Due Process, Procedural Innovation . . . and Parking Tickets, 60 OKLA. L. 
REV. 1, 2 (2007). 
 94. Alex S. Ellerson, Note, The Right to Appeal and Appellate Procedural Reform, 91 
COLUM. L. REV. 373, 382 (1991); see also Jason Parkin, Adaptable Due Process, 160 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1309, 1362 (2012) (“[C]urrent due process doctrine strongly suggests that 
requiring procedural safeguards to adapt to changing facts and circumstances is faithful to 
the Court’s understanding of the dictates of procedural due process.”). 
 95. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 127 (1990). 
 96. Dalton, supra note 12, at 62. 
 97. Fins, supra note 12, at 296. 
 98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. 
GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 54 (Dec. 16, 1966); see also 
Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 983–84 & n.135 (noting that “federal implementing 
legislation may yet be necessary” to incorporate this ICCPR provision into domestic law, 
as “at the time of ratification, every state did provide for some form of appellate review, 
but . . . states are free to abrogate those rights where they are statutory or to amend them 
where protected by state constitutions”). 
 99. Parkin, supra note 94, at 1361. 
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longer justified as by the adoption of new procedures that are 
inconsistent with the basic values of our constitutional heritage.”100 In 
the civil context more broadly, the Court has been willing to consider 
both “[m]odern practice” and “common-law practice” in its due 
process analysis,101 and has applied the Mathews v. Eldridge102 three-
factor balancing test (discussed at greater length in Part II.C.) for 
determining “what process is due.”103 
It is less clear whether the Supreme Court would likewise 
consider modern practice in the criminal context. The Court’s due 
process jurisdiction has been more restrictive in criminal than in civil 
cases. In Medina v. California,104 a decision upholding a state’s 
decision to place the burden of proof on criminal defendants in 
competency hearings, the Court limited the use of the Mathews 
balancing test in criminal cases, holding that it “does not provide the 
appropriate framework for assessing the validity of state procedural 
rules which, like the one at bar, are part of the criminal process.”105 
Instead, the Court concluded that it was appropriate to defer to state 
choices and to conclude that a state’s procedural practice is “not 
subject to proscription under the Due Process Clause unless ‘it 
offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and 
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.’ ”106 
But even in the criminal context, the Court has not limited its 
due process inquiry to historical practice alone, as it demonstrated in 
Medina.107 After “[d]iscerning no historical basis” for concluding that 
“the allocation of the burden of proving incompetence to the 
defendant violates due process,” the Court also “turn[ed] to consider 
whether the rule transgresses any recognized principle of 
‘fundamental fairness’ in operation.”108 Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence, joined by Justice Souter, noted that the Court’s opinion 
did not foreclose an evolving view of due process requirements; she 
wrote, “While I agree with the Court that historical pedigree can give 
a procedural practice a presumption of constitutionality, the 
presumption must surely be rebuttable.”109 As a result, she concluded 
 
 100. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977). 
 101. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 426, 435 (1994). 
 102. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
 103. Id. at 335. 
 104. 505 U.S. 437 (1977). 
 105. Id. at 443. 
 106. Id. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 (1977)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 448. 
 109. Id. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
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that the majority opinion should be read “to allow some weight to be 
given countervailing considerations of fairness in operation, 
considerations much like those the Court evaluated in Mathews.”110 
Legal scholars have also agreed that Justice O’Connor’s reading 
comports with the Court’s criminal due process jurisprudence, as “an 
exclusively historical approach is inconsistent with a large number of 
the Court’s prior criminal cases.”111 As Justice O’Connor had pointed 
out, in cases dealing with such diverse matters as psychiatric 
evaluation for insanity claims, the potential for prejudicial media 
publicity, and the standards for handling potentially exculpatory 
evidence, the Court has historically applied a flexible due process 
standard.112 
Thus, the prevalence of appellate remedies in modern practice 
may support the extension of due process protection to the appellate 
process. On the civil side, the typical test for procedural due process 
is the Mathews balancing test.113 On the criminal side, support of the 
Mathews test would probably not be enough by itself; an advocate 
would also need to show that the right to appeal can be “ranked as 
fundamental” in modern practice.114 
C.  Applying the Mathews Balancing Test 
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court adopted a three-
factor balancing test for determining “what process is due.”115 In the 
decades since it has been adopted, the Mathews test has become the 
most commonly used yardstick for measuring the boundaries of due 
 
 110. Id. 
 111. Jerold H. Israel, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedure: The 
Supreme Court’s Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 303, 423 
(2001); Niki Kuckes, Civil Due Process, Criminal Due Process, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y 
REV. 1, 15 (2006); Bruce J. Winick, Presumptions and Burdens of Proof in Determining 
Competency to Stand Trial: An Analysis of Medina v. California and the Supreme Court’s 
New Due Process Methodology in Criminal Cases, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 817, 827 (1993) 
(“In those cases, cited by Justice O’Connor but ignored by the majority, the Court held 
that the Due Process Clause required procedural safeguards despite a lack of historical 
tradition.”). 
 112. Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (providing a due process 
right for a state-paid psychiatric evaluation in support of insanity claims); Sheppard v. 
Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 335 (1966) (providing due process protection from prejudicial 
media publicity); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (requiring the production of 
potentially exculpatory evidence); Winick, supra note 111, at 826 n.57. 
 113. See infra Part II.C. 
 114. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201–02 
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 115. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976). 
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process.116 The Mathews standard requires courts to weigh (1) “the 
private interest that will be affected by the official action” and (2) 
“the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards” against (3) “the Government’s 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural 
requirement would entail.”117 The Mathews test essentially applies a 
cost-benefit analysis to procedural due process; the Court noted that 
“[a]t some point the benefit of an additional safeguard to the 
individual affected by the administrative action and to society in 
terms of increased insurance that the action is just, may be 
outweighed by the cost.”118 This cost-benefit analysis is not entirely 
unbounded, however. Although it applies to the “additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards” under consideration, it does not 
constrain those procedures necessary to ensure a basic level of 
fairness; courts have noted that “[t]he benefits of efficiency can never 
be purchased at the cost of fairness.”119 
What, then, are the private interests protected by the appellate 
process? The error-correction function of appellate review protects 
litigants from being wrongfully deprived of property (in civil 
litigation) or life and liberty (in criminal litigation). These interests go 
to the heart of the Due Process Clause, which by its very terms 
protects against the deprivation of “life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law.”120 
The value of appellate safeguards for preventing such 
deprivation is likewise significant. Examining the reversal rates 
described above demonstrates the value of appellate protection.121 In 
civil cases, state appellate courts reversed the underlying judgment in 
whole or in part in approximately one-third of the cases.122 In cases 
where the consequence of erroneous property deprivation was the 
 
 116. See California ex rel. Lockyer v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 329 F.3d 700, 
709 n.8 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 117. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
 118. Id. at 348. 
 119. Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 350, 354 (2d Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is 
possible to go too far in the interests of expediency and to sacrifice basic fairness in the 
process.”). 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall any person . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law . . . .”); id. amend. XIV (“[N]or shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .”). 
 121. See supra Part I.A. 
 122. See supra Part I.A. 
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highest (that is, in cases with the largest verdicts), appellate remedies 
were even more valuable; “nearly half (48%) of appeals from trials 
with damage awards of over $1 million were reversed or modified by 
the appellate courts.”123 Without the right to an appeal, civil 
defendants facing a large verdict would be forced to absorb an 
erroneous damage judgment nearly half the time. By any measure, 
this is significant “risk of an erroneous deprivation.”124 
On the criminal side, the incidence of reversal is lower,125 but the 
rights protected—life and liberty—are even more fundamental. Given 
the value of these rights, even a small risk of erroneous deprivation is 
troubling.126 As in civil cases, the defendants at the extremes of the 
sentencing continuum are also the ones most protected by allowing a 
robust appellate process—researchers have found that defendants 
facing the longest sentences were more likely to obtain some relief on 
appeal than were those defendants given middling sentences, while 
defendants facing lower sentences were more likely to obtain 
complete relief.127 
The other side of the Mathews equation—the fiscal cost and 
administrative burden of providing appeals as of right—cannot 
outweigh the benefits provided by a robust appellate system; as one 
scholar has noted, “[I]f appeals were so unduly burdensome . . . it 
seems unlikely that forty-seven states would have enacted a first 
appeal as of right in criminal cases and the other three would have 
enacted discretionary appellate procedures.”128 When donning the 
Rawlsian “veil of ignorance”129 to determine what procedures an 
individual would expect if facing either a large civil verdict or 
criminal sentence, most individuals would likely find the cost of 
 
 123. COHEN, supra note 20, at 6. 
 124. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 345 (1979). 
 125. See supra Part I.A. 
 126. Such reversals may arise either because the defendant was factually innocent or 
because the defendant was denied important procedural protections. See Arkin, supra note 
8, at 548 (“If factual innocence is the ultimate criterion, then current reversal and sentence 
modification rates may overstate the additional accuracy provided by an appeal because 
many of these determinations reflect procedural defects rather than judgments that the 
defendants were, in fact, possibly innocent.”). 
 127. CHAPPER & HANSON, supra note 34, at 6 (“ ‘Winning big’ (i.e., an acquittal or a 
new trial) occurs most frequently in appeals with the least serious sentence; appeals 
involving the longest sentences show the highest percentage of ‘winning little’ (i.e., 
resentencing or other modification).”). 
 128. Arkin, supra note 8, at 549. 
 129. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136–42 (1971) (developing the concept 
of a “veil of ignorance,” which asks what societal rules parties would make if they were 
forced to act without knowledge of whether those rules would prove beneficial or 
detrimental to them personally).  
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appellate procedure a small one to pay for the protection against 
erroneous deprivation of life, liberty, or property. 
In fact, the electorate of almost every U.S. jurisdiction has 
chosen to support just this balance: the federal system and nearly all 
states already provide an appeal of right even absent a constitutional 
obligation to do so. In the states without statutory protection for 
appeals, the electorate’s inability to don such a Rawlsian veil has 
hindered the adoption of such a right. On the civil side, corporations 
who believe they are likely to face large verdicts support expanded 
appellate rights, and plaintiffs’ attorneys who rely on enforcing large 
judgments oppose them.130 On the criminal side, felon 
disenfranchisement laws means that those facing significant prison 
sentences may be excluded entirely from the electorate.131 The 
extension of appellate rights has thus become politicized in recent 
decades,132 and a state facing such questions today is therefore in a 
different position than a state that adopted broad appellate rights a 
century ago. 
For the jurisdictions who have already created such a statutory 
right, however, constitutionalizing the appellate process would not 
increase costs at all—though it would prohibit cutting existing 
appellate rights to remedy a budget shortfall.133 In a jurisdiction 
without mandatory appellate rights, there would be an added cost in 
providing an appeal as of right in every civil case.134 Expansion of the 
court system requires funding, and adding additional cases to 
appellate dockets is likely to delay the resolution of pending cases. 
The administrative burden is somewhat lighter given that the 
 
 130. See supra Part I. 
 131. Alexandra Natapoff, Speechless: The Silencing of Criminal Defendants, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1449, 1504 n.146 (2005). 
 132. See supra Part I.B. 
 133. See Parker & Chapman, supra note 10, at 582 (“Discretionary review would save 
time, money, and effort and would more honestly describe the system currently in place, a 
system in which courts exercise discretion behind a facade of deliberation.”). See 
generally Barrow, supra note 10 (arguing that reform of Virginia’s discretionary appeal 
would be a cost-effective way of improving the quality of appellate justice); Lay, supra 
note 10 (arguing for the adoption of discretionary appeal in federal cases). 
 134. It should be noted, however, that when the West Virginia Supreme Court adopted 
a new rule providing appellate review as of right, it did so without additional funding or 
resources. Because the rule was changed in late 2012, it remains to be seen how well it 
will work in practice. Additionally, because the change was adopted through the 
rulemaking process, it remains subject to change by the court. See Robin Jean Davis, 
Supreme Court Justice of the W. Va. Supreme Court, Revised Rules of Appellate 
Procedure Modernize the Appellate Process, W. VA. LAW., 
http://www.courtswv.gov/public-resources/press/cj-column/Davis-July-Sep-2010.htm (last 
visited July 17, 2012). 
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appellate infrastructure already exists. Even states with a purely 
discretionary system of appeals could integrate an appeal as of right 
without changing their court structure, although they might face the 
fiscal cost of added staff and a higher administrative burden if the 
same number of judges were to issue opinions on a larger number of 
cases. West Virginia’s new court rule providing review of all appeals 
will be a good test case for whether such review can be done with 
additional funding; even without legislative support, the court 
quintupled the number of cases decided in the first four months of 
operating under the new rules.135 
III. DOCTRINAL CONSISTENCY AND APPELLATE REVIEW 
The fundamental importance of private interests which appellate 
error correction protects—and the risk of erroneous deprivation of 
life, liberty, or property without such process—may tip the balance in 
favor of recognizing a constitutional due process right of appeal. As 
the American Bar Association has pointed out, appellate review is not 
merely a desirable part of legal practice—it is, instead, a 
“fundamental element of procedural fairness.”136 
This Part goes beyond the Mathews analysis to examine how the 
right to appeal has become ensconced among the procedures required 
to ensure basic fairness. It analyzes the role of appellate remedies in 
the development and consistent application of legal rules. Whereas 
the prior Part analyzed the right to appeal as a matter of freestanding 
procedure, this Part puts the right within its doctrinal context. It 
argues that the Supreme Court’s disavowal of such a right is 
inconsistent with the way the Court has developed constitutional 
doctrines related to the appellate process. 
In examining the right to appeal as part of the larger doctrinal 
framework, it is necessary to go beyond the bare requirements of the 
Mathews procedural due process analysis. As other scholars have 
noted, Mathews itself is not ideal for determining when judicial 
review (either by a district court judge or on appeal) is needed; these 
questions “raise issues lying beyond the Mathews framework.”137 As 
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 136. 3 AM. BAR ASS’N, JUDICIAL ADMIN. DIV., STANDARDS RELATING TO 
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the Supreme Court has recognized, procedures that are required for 
fundamental fairness are not subject to restriction under the Mathews 
test.138 Assessing whether a practice ranks as fundamental brings 
together the substantive and procedural strands of the due process 
analysis; both of the strands, at their core, protect against the arbitrary 
application of government power.139 
With regard to appellate review, the surrounding doctrine 
suggests that a right to appeal has indeed become a fundamental 
protection of litigant rights in both civil and criminal litigation. First, 
the Supreme Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has effectively 
created a right to meaningful appeal for indigent criminal defendants. 
Second, the Court’s treatment of criminal appeals mooted by the 
defendant’s death expresses a degree of deference to the appellate 
process that is inconsistent with a lack of appellate rights. Finally, the 
Court’s requirement of heightened review on appeal in punitive 
damage and libel cases can only be effective if there is also a right to 
appellate review in the first instance. 
A.  Equal Protection and Due Process on Appeal 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet acknowledged a due 
process right to appeal, it has relied on the equal protection doctrine 
to prohibit states from withholding statutory appellate remedies from 
indigent criminal defendants. This trend began with Griffin v. 
Illinois,140 in which the Court reversed a state-court judgment that 
allowed non-capital defendants to appeal only if they paid for a copy 
of the trial record and transcript, and ordered that “[d]estitute 
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as 
defendants who have money enough to buy transcripts.”141 The 
plurality opinion reiterated its statement from McKane v. Durston that 
states are “not required by the Federal Constitution to provide 
appellate courts or a right to appellate review at all,” but it specified 
that the lack of an appellate requirement did not mean that a “[s]tate 
that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that discriminates 
against some convicted defendants on account of their poverty.”142 
 
undue process claims. Its balancing test placed governmental interests in decision costs on 
the same plane as private interests in process modifications.”). 
 138. See Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443 (1992). 
 139. See Fallon, supra note 9, at 372. 
 140. 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion). 
 141. Id. at 19. 
 142. Id. at 18 (citing McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684 (1894)). 
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Although the plurality opinion in Griffin seemed to rest on an 
equal-protection ground, it emphasized the importance of appellate 
review in general. The opinion noted that “[a]ll of the States now 
provide some method of appeal from criminal convictions, 
recognizing the importance of appellate review to a correct 
adjudication of guilt or innocence.”143 It also recognized how reliant 
the states have become on the error-correction function of appeals, 
stating that “[s]tatistics show that a substantial proportion of criminal 
convictions are reversed by state appellate courts” and acknowledging 
that “deny[ing] adequate review to the poor means that many of them 
may lose their life, liberty or property because of unjust convictions 
which appellate courts would set aside.”144 
Perhaps because this rhetoric sounded as if the Court might be 
willing to recognize a due process right of appeal, Justice Frankfurter 
concurred separately in an attempt to forestall such an interpretation. 
He noted that it might be tempting to find a due process basis for such 
protection: “The right to an appeal from a conviction for crime is 
today so established that this leads to the easy assumption that it is 
fundamental to the protection of life and liberty and therefore a 
necessary ingredient of due process of law.”145 Nevertheless, he 
cautioned that such an interpretation would be in error: “It is 
significant that no appeals from convictions in the federal courts were 
afforded (with roundabout exceptions negligible for present purposes) 
for nearly a hundred years . . . it is now settled that due process of law 
does not require a State to afford review of criminal judgments.”146 
He therefore suggested that states who found themselves overly 
burdened by facilitating indigent appeals could choose to reduce 
appellate rights for all.147 
In spite of Justice Frankfurter’s concerns, states did not retract 
appellate rights after Griffin—instead, appellate practices continued 
to develop, and the Supreme Court came nearer to recognizing the 
fundamental importance of appellate remedies. In Eskridge v. 
Washington State Board of Prison Terms & Paroles,148 the Court 
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 144. Id. at 18–19. 
 145. Id. at 20 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
 146. Id. at 21. 
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struck down a law that authorized a trial judge to order a transcript at 
public expense only “if in his opinion justice will thereby be 
promoted.”149 Although this procedure instituted an extra level of 
discretionary review by having the trial judge review the case to see if 
an appeal was warranted, the Court nevertheless held that the case 
was controlled by Griffin because it discriminated against indigent 
defendants in the appeal process; those who could pay for a trial 
transcript did not need to persuade the trial court that justice would be 
promoted by allowing an appeal.150 
In Douglas v. California,151 the Court further expanded the 
Griffin anti-discrimination rule to include the right to counsel on 
appeal. Specifically, it held that the state’s failure to appoint counsel 
for an indigent’s appeal violated equal protection:  
Where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit 
of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law, 
and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent, 
already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case 
is without merit, is forced to shift for himself.152 
Again, while the Court’s reasoning focused on the different situations 
of rich and poor, the Court’s rhetoric also hinted at the importance of 
the appellate process more generally; the Court noted that without 
appointed counsel, an indigent defendant would be left “without a 
champion on appeal” and would thereby be “deprived” of “showing 
that his appeal ha[d] hidden merit” beyond what was shown in the 
trial record.153 
Interestingly, the Court retreated a bit from its equal protection 
jurisprudence in Ross v. Moffitt154 and appeared to move toward a due 
process principle. In Ross, the question before the Court was whether 
an indigent defendant was entitled to counsel for a second level of 
appeal—specifically, the defendant had an appeal as of right in the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals (and was provided counsel for that 
appeal), but sought further review in the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina.155 The U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged that a strict equal 
protection analysis would give rise to a requirement for appellate 
counsel: rich defendants, after all, had access to counsel to assist in 
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petitioning the state supreme court.156 Nevertheless, the Court 
acknowledged that the “precise rationale for the Griffin and Douglas 
lines of cases has never been explicitly stated,” and noted that “some 
support” was “derived from the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of 
that Amendment.”157 In an analysis that combined the two clauses, the 
Court determined that failure to provide appellate counsel for the first 
appeal as of right would unconstitutionally discriminate against the 
poor, but that the provision of counsel in a second layer of appellate 
review was a choice left to the state; any remaining disadvantage 
would be “far less than the handicap borne by the indigent defendant 
denied counsel on his initial appeal as of right in Douglas.”158 
In spite of the Court’s unwillingness to acknowledge a 
constitutional right of appeal in criminal cases, its jurisprudence 
nonetheless supports such a view. As the Court acknowledged in 
Ross, the Equal Protection Clause cannot be doing all the work—if 
equal protection were the only rationale, there would be no basis on 
which to distinguish a first level of appeal from a second level.159 The 
Court’s willingness to find a constitutional right to a trial record and 
to appellate counsel suggests that the Court recognizes the 
fundamental importance of the appellate process. The Court’s 
unwillingness to extend the right to counsel beyond a single appeal as 
of right further suggests a limiting principle—the existence of one 
appeal as of right may be fundamentally woven into the fabric of the 
justice system, but that a second level of review is not likewise 
engrained in a basic notion of fairness.160 The Court’s subsequent 
jurisprudence on effective assistance of counsel on appeal further 
reinforces this distinction. When a state provides a right of direct 
appeal, criminal defendants have a right to effective assistance of 
counsel on appeal—and this right means that counsel cannot simply 
decline to file an appeal they believe is meritless, but must instead 
 
 156. See id. at 616. 
 157. Id. at 608–09. 
 158. Id. at 616, 619. 
 159. Id. at 609 n.8 (quoting the circuit court’s opinion, which noted that if Douglas 
rested on equal protection alone, “the same concepts of fairness and equality, which 
require counsel in a first appeal of right, require counsel in other and subsequent 
discretionary appeals” (quoting Moffitt v. Ross, 483 F.2d 650, 655 (4th Cir. 1973))). 
 160. Cf. Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas 
Corpus, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 541, 544 (2009) (arguing that “due process and equal 
protection principles” would dictate a similar result when the direct appeal process did not 
afford an opportunity to raise critical issues, and thus “whenever habeas petitioners seek 
review of claims for which habeas corpus provides the first opportunity for judicial 
review”). 
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brief any issue “that might arguably support the appeal.”161 On 
collateral or discretionary review, however, such procedures are not 
required.162 
B.  The Treatment of Criminal Appeals Mooted by Appellant’s 
Death 
The treatment of criminal convictions mooted by the appellant’s 
death also demonstrates the value placed on the appellate process in 
the criminal justice system. If an individual convicted of a crime in 
federal district court dies while the case is on appeal, the circuit courts 
of appeals require the conviction to be abated ab initio—that is, the 
court will not merely dismiss the pending appeal, but will also enter 
“orders remanding [such] cases to the district courts with instructions 
to vacate the judgment and to dismiss the indictment or 
information.”163 At one time, the Supreme Court followed the same 
rule for petitions for certiorari.164 However, it later overruled that 
decision, choosing only to dismiss the certiorari petition and not the 
underlying case.165 The shift was interpreted by the circuit courts as 
an acknowledgement of the different roles played by the discretionary 
certiorari system versus the appeals of right allowed in the circuit 
courts: 
The Supreme Court may dismiss the petition without 
prejudicing the rights of a deceased petitioner, for he has 
already had the benefit of the appellate review of his conviction 
to which he was entitled of right. In contrast, when an appeal 
has been taken from a criminal conviction to the court of 
appeals and death has deprived the accused of his right to our 
decision, the interests of justice ordinarily require that he not 
stand convicted without resolution of the merits of his appeal, 
which is an “integral part of [our] system for finally 
adjudicating [his] guilt or innocence.”166 
When appeals as of right are statutorily granted (as they are in 
the federal courts), dismissing the indictment—rather than merely the 
appeal itself—only makes sense if the appeal is considered to be a 
 
 161. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). 
 162. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 558 (1987). 
 163. Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 951. 
 164. Durham v. United States, 401 U.S. 481, 483 (1971). 
 165. Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325, 325 (1976) (“The petition for certiorari is 
therefore dismissed. To the extent that Durham v. United States may be inconsistent with 
this ruling, Durham is overruled.” (citation omitted)). 
 166. United States v. Pauline, 625 F.2d 684, 685 (5th Cir. 1980) (quoting Griffin v. 
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956)). 
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fundamental part of the criminal process. In other words, the 
underlying principle cannot just be that “punishment is impossible 
without the body of the defendant”—if this were the only reason for 
the practice, dismissal of the appeal as moot would be sufficient, or at 
the least the appeal could consider the conviction in order to 
determine the propriety of monetary forfeitures or penalties.167 
Abating the case ab initio, however, supports the view that 
“punishment is illegitimate without appellate review of the trial court 
conviction,” and that there is “not only an irrevocable individual right 
of appeal, but also a societal need for certitude that is dependent upon 
appellate review.”168 Nevertheless, a number of courts place such 
weight on the value of appellate review that they extend the 
abatement remedy beyond the conviction itself, and likewise vacate 
the collateral punishments of “criminal forfeitures and fines.”169 
Of course, the Supreme Court itself has not required such 
abatement of criminal appeals as a part of constitutional practice. 
Nevertheless, the circuit courts’ treatment of the cases aligns with the 
Supreme Court’s emphasis on the protection of constitutional rights 
by and through appeals in criminal cases. Thus, for example, the 
Court “has prescribed and applied new requirements of de novo 
appellate review of lower courts’ decisions of some (but not all) 
mixed questions of federal constitutional law and fact in criminal 
cases”—even while professing that there is no constitutional right to 
appeal and without “specify[ing] what provision of the Constitution 
authorizes it to so regulate criminal appeals in states that do choose to 
allow them, much less to explain why it so interpreted this 
unidentified provision.”170 In these criminal-law cases, the Court left 
unclear whether state-level appellate courts were obligated to apply 
the same appellate standard;171 as discussed in the next Section, 
 
 167. Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 956. 
 168. Id. at 956–57. 
 169. United States v. Christopher, 273 F.3d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 2001); see also 
Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 961 (“Some courts erase all collateral aspects of a conviction 
as having no independent force absent the convicted offender.”). It should be noted, 
however, that this approach is a matter of custom rather than law—and it is a custom that 
the states do not uniformly follow. See, e.g., State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 568 (N.J. 
1997). 
 170. Coombs, supra note 59, at 542–43 (discussing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 
690 (1996)). 
 171. Id. at 551; see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1265 (Utah 1993) (“[A]fter 
reflecting on the principles governing the choice of a particular standard of review and 
considering the law on analogous questions, we have concluded that this court is not 
required to apply federal standards of review when presented with challenges to trial court 
determinations made under federal law.”). 
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however, the Court did require state appellate courts to do so in the 
related area of punitive damages.172 
C.  Heightened Appellate Review in Certain Civil Cases 
The Supreme Court’s civil jurisprudence also relies on the 
assumption that appellate remedies will buttress constitutional rights. 
As some scholars and litigants have pointed out, this assumption is 
most easily visible in the Court’s jurisprudence on punitive 
damages.173 Two decades ago, a plurality of the Supreme Court 
asserted that the Due Process Clause prohibits a court from making a 
punitive damage award that is “so excessive that it must be deemed 
an arbitrary deprivation of property without due process of law.”174 
A year later, in Honda Motor Company v. Oberg,175 the Court 
struck down a judgment for punitive damages in a case arising out of 
an Oregon state court, holding that judicial review of punitive damage 
awards was required as a matter of constitutional due process.176 At 
the time the case arose, a provision of the Oregon Constitution 
prohibited judicial review of punitive damage awards “unless the 
court [could] affirmatively say there [was] no evidence to support the 
verdict.”177 A jury awarded the plaintiff $5 million in a product 
liability case against Honda, and both the Oregon Court of Appeals 
and the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the verdict.178 The U.S. 
Supreme Court reversed that judgment and remanded to the Oregon 
Supreme Court for further review.179 Although the Court’s opinion 
focused on judicial review rather than appellate review (and it 
therefore left open the possibility that the trial judge’s review of the 
jury’s verdict could suffice), the opinion did state in dicta that “the 
availability of both ‘meaningful and adequate review by the trial 
court’ and subsequent appellate review” would give rise “to a strong 
presumption of validity.”180 
 
 172. See infra Part III.C. 
 173. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers 
in Support of the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 7–10, Mountain Enters. v. Fitch, 541 
U.S. 989 (2004) (No. 03-1223), 2004 WL 692247, at *7–10; Brief of Amici Curiae Law 
Professors In Support of Petitioner, supra note 12, at 7, 2008 WL 4360892, at *7. 
 174. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 453 (1993). 
 175. 512 U.S. 415 (1994). 
 176. Id. at 418. 
 177. Id. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. at 435. 
 180. Id. at 420–21 (emphasis added) (quoting TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 
509 U.S. 443, 457 (1993)). 
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The Supreme Court subsequently addressed the standard of 
review on appeal in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool 
Group.181 In that case, a jury had awarded $4.5 million in punitive 
damages in a trademark infringement case.182 The trial judge 
“considered, and rejected, arguments that the punitive damages were 
‘grossly excessive.’ ”183 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment after 
reviewing it under an “abuse of discretion” standard.184 The Supreme 
Court reversed the judgment, holding that the appellate court had a 
duty to review the judgment under a non-deferential de novo standard 
of review.185 The Court relied on an analysis of institutional 
competence in applying the three guideposts of a due process review 
of punitive damages. It concluded that the district court might have a 
“somewhat superior vantage” in reviewing “the degree or 
reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct,” but that the trial and 
appellate courts were equally good at determining “the disparity 
between the harm (or potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the 
punitive damages award” and that appellate courts had greater 
expertise in reviewing “the difference between the punitive damages 
awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in 
comparable cases.”186 The Court therefore held that appellate courts 
must conduct a de novo review of punitive damages.187 Although 
Cooper Industries applied to the federal circuits, the Supreme Court 
soon extended the de novo review requirement to state courts of 
appeals as well.188 
The Court’s requirement of heightened review in punitive 
damages cases undermines previous statements that no such right 
exists. Indeed, the Court’s language, though written to explain why 
deferential review is insufficient in the punitive damages context, 
actually reads more as a defense of appellate review in general. First, 
the Court pointed to the error correction function of appellate review, 
noting that “[e]xacting appellate review ensures that an award of 
punitive damages is based upon an ‘application of law, rather than a 
 
 181. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
 182. Id. at 429. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 430–31. 
 185. Id. at 436. 
 186. Id. at 440. 
 187. Id. at 436. 
 188. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 418 (2003) (noting, in 
a case arising in a Utah state court, that “[w]e reiterated the importance of these three 
guideposts in Cooper Industries and mandated appellate courts to conduct de novo review 
of a trial court’s application of them to the jury’s award”). 
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decisionmaker’s caprice.’ ”189 Second, the Court noted that “de novo 
review tends to unify precedent and stabilize the law,” and it 
expresses hope that the amorphous concept of “gross excessiveness” 
will gain stability and meaning through case-by-case application at 
the appellate level.190 The law-stabilizing and unifying effects are also 
classic benefits of appellate review.191 Thus, the basis for requiring 
heightened appellate review of punitive damage awards mirrors the 
benefits of appellate review in general; it is very difficult to reconcile 
the Court’s requirement of de novo appellate review of punitive 
damages with a system in which no appellate review is required at all. 
Moreover, at least one state has interpreted the Supreme Court’s 
punitive damage jurisprudence as trumping state constitutional 
restrictions on the jurisdiction of appellate courts.192 In Texas, the 
state constitution prohibits the Texas Supreme Court from ruling on 
questions of fact; it requires that “[t]he decision of [the courts of 
appeals] shall be conclusive on all questions of fact brought before 
them on appeal or error.”193 The Texas Supreme Court had interpreted 
the provision to limit that court’s review of the excessiveness of trial 
court judgments; while the intermediate courts were free to suggest a 
remittitur, the Texas Supreme Court could not do so.194 Thus, on 
questions of excessiveness, the intermediate courts of appeals would 
have the last word under the state constitution.195 Nevertheless, the 
Texas Supreme Court adopted the requirement that it conduct a de 
novo review of punitive damages.196 It noted that “the Supreme Court 
of the United States has found unconstitutional a state constitutional 
provision limiting appellate scrutiny of exemplary damages to no-
evidence review” and concluded that “[o]nly by adhering to [its] 
practice of reviewing exemplary damages for constitutional (rather 
than factual) excessiveness [could it] avoid a similar constitutional 
conflict.”197 Again, however, if constitutional due process does not 
 
 189. Id. (quoting Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436). 
 190. Cooper Indus., 532 U.S. at 436. 
 191. See supra Part I (explaining the benefits of appellate review). 
 192. Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 307 (Tex. 2006). 
 193. TEX. CONST. art. V, § 6. 
 194. Alamo Nat’l Bank v. Kraus, 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981); TEX. R. APP. P. 
46.3. 
 195. R. Jack Ayres, Jr., Judicial Nullification of the Right to Trial by Jury by 
“Evolving” Standards of Appellate Review, 60 BAYLOR L. REV. 337, 413 (2008). 
 196. Tony Gullo Motors, 212 S.W.3d at 307 n.30. 
 197. Id. at 307. It is also difficult to separate the “constitutional” part of the analysis 
from the “factual” part. See, e.g., Sandra Sperino, Judicial Preemption of Punitive 
Damages, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 227, 231 (2009) (“[I]n many cases lower courts simply 
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require an appeal at all, it is hard to imagine that it requires a state 
court to adopt a heightened level of review that it would not otherwise 
apply—especially when that review would conflict with a state 
constitutional provision. 
Finally, punitive damages are not the only area in which the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional doctrine conflicts with the denial of 
appellate review. The Court has also required heightened appellate 
review of actual malice in libel cases, holding that the normal “clearly 
erroneous” standard would not apply on appeal, but that instead 
“[a]ppellate judges in such a case must exercise independent 
judgment and determine whether the record establishes actual malice 
with convincing clarity.”198 In the libel context, the constitutional 
interest being protected was one of speech, not one of due process; 
essentially, the Court resolving a conflict between “deference to 
factual findings by the trier of fact and an appellate duty to safeguard 
First Amendment freedoms.”199 The Court’s rationale for independent 
appellate review was again reminiscent of the logic of appellate 
review in general; it needed to supervise the lower courts to ensure 
that its announced legal principles “have been constitutionally 
applied”200 in a consistent manner “in order to preserve the precious 
liberties established and ordained by the Constitution.”201 As in the 
Court’s punitive damages jurisprudence, its rationale for heightened 
review reflects the importance of appellate review in general; without 
it, the Court implies, we would not be able to ensure the preservation 
of constitutional guarantees.202 
 
claim the mantle of constitutional excessiveness to justify other, nonconstitutional 
inquiries, with little or no actual relationship to excessiveness.”). 
 198. Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984); see Brief of 
Amicus Curiae of the American Academy of Appellate Lawyers, supra note 173, at 10–
12, 2004 WL 692247, at *10–12. 
 199. Tung Yin, Independent Appellate Review of Knowledge of Falsity in Defamation 
and False Statements Cases, 15 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 325, 386 (2010). 
 200. Bose Corp., 466 U.S. at 508. 
 201. Id. at 485. 
 202. Other commentators have argued that appeals are integral to the protection of 
substantive constitutional rights. See Arkin, supra note 8, at 557 (“[S]o much of 
constitutional criminal law is woven around the availability of an appeal to effectuate 
explicit constitutional guarantees that appeals are constitutionally necessary whenever any 
explicit constitutional right is implicated.”); Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment “Due 
Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 551 (1970) (“The first amendment due process cases 
have shown that first amendment rights are fragile and can be destroyed by insensitive 
procedures; in order to completely fulfill the promise of those cases, courts must 
thoroughly evaluate every aspect of the procedural system which protects those rights.”). 
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IV. THE SYSTEMIC INTEGRATION OF PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS 
Doctrinal consistency requires a right to appeal at least criminal 
convictions, punitive damages awards, and libel judgments. But what 
about other areas of the law? This Part explores how the modern 
American justice system has developed in a way that weaves a robust 
system of appellate remedies into the very fabric of the justice system 
as a whole, creating a unified tapestry of procedural safeguards.203 At 
the time of the country’s founding, the idea of error correction 
through the appellate process was more unusual; the function of 
“[l]aw declaration” was written into the Constitution with the creation 
of the Supreme Court, but the concept of “law application” through 
appeal developed only later with the creation of the intermediate 
appellate courts.204 
As a matter of practice, appeals have grown in prevalence and 
have become part of the legal culture.205 At the same time, however, 
the procedural safeguards of an earlier era have diminished: civil jury 
trials are far less common today; class actions and other types of 
high-stakes litigation have increased, summary judgment has grown, 
and civil pleading requirements are in flux.206 These procedures 
developed in an era of robust appellate remedies, and they have 
created a situation in which the relationship between the trial and 
appeal are rightfully considered to exist in a symbiotic relationship.207 
A. Procedural Changes 
The shifting procedural landscape demonstrates how the 
importance of appellate review extends beyond individual satisfaction 
 
 203. On the importance of cross-doctrinal and transsubstantive consistency, see, for 
example, Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of Modern American 
Procedure, 93 JUDICATURE 109, 111 (2009) (“[T]here is widespread understanding that in 
a system that seeks to allocate prospective lawmaking responsibility categorically overt 
departures from transsubstantivity would raise questions of institutional power and 
legitimacy.”); Scott Dodson, In Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 
79 (2008) (“Doctrinal consistency looks at the particular provision and its doctrinal 
equivalents, such as the statutes of limitations. Cross-doctrinal consistency, on the other 
hand, looks at how doctrinally analogous provisions have been treated.”). 
 204. Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 239 
(1985) (“Law declaration, not law application, is the appellate courts’ only constitutionally 
mandated duty.”); Steinman, supra note 13, at 1618 (noting that the intermediate appellate 
courts primarily engage in error correction, whereas the Supreme Court primarily acts to 
“pronounce and harmonize” the law). 
 205. See supra Part I. 
 206. See John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United States, 122 
YALE L.J. 522, 524 (2012). 
 207. Arkin, supra note 8, at 577–78 (arguing that the constitutionalization of criminal 
procedure also creates a need for appellate remedies). 
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and the private rights included in the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis. 
Instead, appellate review sustains civil procedure more broadly. The 
availability of appellate review allows trial judges to take a broader 
and more managerial role in litigation, while protecting against the 
possibility of irreversible harm caused by a single judge’s biased or 
otherwise flawed decision making. It is unlikely that we would have 
seen some of the recent procedural developments take place in the 
absence of robust appellate rights; without the safety valve that 
appellate rights provide, the judicial system would have had to rely on 
other mechanisms of protecting litigants’ interests—perhaps by 
allowing more cases to go all the way through the trial process or by 
allowing even fewer cases to proceed as class actions. Unless the 
Supreme Court decides to turn back the clock on these procedural 
developments, a robust system of appellate remedies is required to 
ensure that litigants’ substantive rights can be protected.208 
1. The Growth of Complexity 
Legal doctrine has grown increasingly complex in both criminal 
procedure and in civil litigation. On the criminal side, observers have 
noted that “[b]oth state and federal criminal trials are far more 
complex proceedings today than they were just before the turn of the 
century when McKane v. Durston was decided.”209 This modern 
criminal procedure has been called a “jungle of doctrines” that 
includes the law of custodial interrogation and Miranda rights, 
search-and-seizure practices, the exclusionary rule, and the right to 
counsel.210 These doctrines increase the complexity of criminal 
prosecutions and thereby “enhance[] the likelihood of trial error at the 
trial level and the corresponding need for corrective appellate 
process.”211 As a result of the growth in criminal doctrine, cases tend 
 
 208. See Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 613 (“[W]hatever faults today’s procedural 
systems may have, no systemic remodeling appears on the horizon.”). 
 209. Id. at 574; George C. Thomas III, Remapping the Criminal Procedure Universe, 
83 VA. L. REV. 1819, 1819 (1997) (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION 
AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES (1997)) (“[T]he law of criminal procedure 
had become encrusted with doctrinal complexities that seemed to bear little or no 
relationship to the underlying constitutional rights.”). 
 210. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 600. 
 211. Arkin, supra note 8, at 576. See generally Thomas, supra note 209 (noting these 
various complexities in constitutional criminal procedure). This complexity is 
compounded in cases involving technology; thus, for example, search-and-seizure doctrine 
must accommodate technological developments that “enable an increasing array of 
searches that, while not necessarily physically intrusive, have the potential to wholly 
eviscerate an individual’s privacy.” Jeffrey Bellin, Crime-Severity Distinctions and the 
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to be “increasingly front-loaded such that the trial is no longer the 
main event.”212 Instead, pretrial procedure and plea bargains play a 
larger role.213 
On the civil side, courts today are facing a greater number of 
complex, high-value, high-stakes lawsuits.214 Economic development 
and the migration of corporate headquarters led to greater complexity 
in commercial litigation across the nation; likewise, patent, antitrust, 
civil rights, and environmental cases also added complexity in civil 
litigation and increased the length of trial proceedings.215 Class 
actions and other forms of aggregate litigation have also increased 
dramatically.216 As complexity and value increased, so too did risk; 
such large-scale litigation created a risk—and sometimes a reality—
of bankruptcy, even for large corporate defendants.217 
2. The Vanishing Jury Trial and the Rise of the Managerial Judge 
Due in part to the growth of complexity, modern litigation has 
seen a shift of power from the jury to the trial judge. Historically, 
expanded jury rights protected against the risks inherent in having a 
single decision maker.218 When the Seventh Amendment guarantee 
 
Fourth Amendment: Reassessing Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IOWA L. REV. 
1, 40 (2011). 
 212. Justin F. Marceau, Embracing a New Era of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 14 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1161, 1162 (2012). 
 213. Id. at 1162 n.6. 
 214. Roger C. Cramton, Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary Americans, 44 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 531, 536 (1994) (“Recent decades have shown, however, an increase in 
the volume, complexity, length, and cost of high-stakes litigation, especially in the federal 
courts.”). 
 215. See Stephen McG. Bundy, The Policy in Favor of Settlement in an Adversary 
System, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 30 n.115 (1992). 
 216. See Judith Resnik, Compared to What?: ALI Aggregation and the Shifting 
Contours of Due Process and of Lawyers’ Powers, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 628, 657 
(2011) (“Through new procedures, mechanisms, and doctrines, the possible meanings of 
the word ‘case’ changed—such that tens of thousands of people came to be understood as 
somehow together . . . in something called a ‘litigation’ that can result, on occasion, in 
institutional reform or in millions of dollars distributed to thousands of individuals as 
compensation for injuries.”). 
 217. See In re Johns-Manville Corp., 36 B.R. 727, 729 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984); Alan 
N. Resnick, Bankruptcy as a Vehicle for Resolving Enterprise-Threatening Mass Tort 
Liability, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2045, 2045 (2000) (“The high costs of litigation threaten 
both adequate compensation for the vast number of victims and the survival of the 
defendant’s business.”); Resnik, supra note 216, at 659 (“Some of the asbestos 
manufacturers had gone into bankruptcy, and their tort claimants trailed along, forcing 
group-based handling of mass torts.”). 
 218. But see Jason M. Solomon, The Political Puzzle of the Civil Jury, 61 EMORY L.J. 
1331, 1370 (2012) (noting that although others have argued that the jury offers the 
“ ‘many-minds’ benefits of information aggregation and deliberation,” these potential 
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was adopted in 1791, proponents expected the civil jury to “protect 
private parties against the application of unjust laws, overreaching by 
the government when it appears as a litigant, and biased federal 
judges.”219 The jury trial functioned, at least to some degree, in just 
this manner; civil juries in the early years of the Republic “nullified” 
debt-collection actions by British loyalists and abolitionist juries 
refused to apply civil remedies in cases involving slavery.220 By the 
end of the nineteenth century, however, “the American tradition of 
law-finding by jurors” had given way to a more limited role for the 
jury as fact-finder, reserving pure question of law for the judge 
alone.221 
At the same time as the jury’s power decreased in civil cases, the 
managerial power of the judge increased.222 Judges took a greater role 
in “speeding the resolution of cases and for persuading litigants to 
settle rather than try cases whenever possible”; judges also took on 
new roles as “mediators, negotiators, and planners” in an effort to 
efficiently manage a growing docket.223 On the criminal side, reliance 
on plea bargains has grown dramatically and in turn reduced the 
power of the jury.224 At the trial court level, therefore, the power of 
the judge grew, while the litigants were left “with fewer procedural 
safeguards to protect them from abuse of that authority.”225 
In both civil and criminal litigation, the pretrial phase (where the 
judge is preeminent) has grown to overshadow the trial phase and 
therefore “inevitably undermined” the jury even further by reducing 
the number of trials.226 In 1936, 20% of civil cases filed went to trial; 
by 2002, 1.2% of federal cases went to trial before a jury, and only 
0.6% of state cases did so.227 In criminal cases, the rise of plea 
bargaining means that only 4% of federal prosecutions and 1.2% of 
 
benefits “are not likely to support a claim of epistemic superiority given the way the jury 
actually functions”). 
 219. Lars Noah, Civil Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1601, 1627 (2001). 
 220. Id. at 1628. 
 221. Id. at 1631 (noting that the United States Supreme Court, in Chicago Rock Island 
& Pacific Railway Co. v. Cole, 251 U.S. 54, 56 (1919), “rejected a federal due process 
challenge to [an Oklahoma] constitutional provision that preserved a law-finding function 
for civil juries on certain issues in tort litigation”). 
 222. Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 379 (1982). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“[T]he reality [is] that criminal 
justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials. Ninety-seven 
percent of federal convictions and ninety-four percent of state convictions are the result of 
guilty pleas.”). 
 225. Resnik, supra note 222, at 380. 
 226. Langbein, supra note 206, at 571. 
 227. Id. at 524. 
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state prosecutions now get to a jury.228 As with criminal practice, 
pretrial activity has overshadowed trial procedure; now, as Professor 
Langbein has stated, “[T]he pretrial becomes the nontrial.”229 
3. Summary Judgment Practice and Pleading Standards 
Going along with the decline in jury trials and the rise of the 
managerial judge, summary disposition devices in civil litigation have 
also increased markedly in some categories of civil litigation.230 
Although the precise number of cases dismissed on summary 
judgment is disputed,231 it is agreed that the use of summary judgment 
has had a tremendous impact in certain civil cases—research has 
shown that defendants prevail on summary judgment in nearly two-
thirds of civil rights and employment discrimination cases.232 
Summary procedures give individual judges a great deal of 
control over which cases should be allowed to go forward. Summary 
judgment, which was made easier by a 1986 trilogy of Supreme Court 
cases, allows cases to be resolved after the time for discovery has 
passed if, in the judge’s view, there are no remaining issues of 
material fact to be decided at trial.233 Professor Suja Thomas has 
argued that the use of summary judgment unconstitutionally 
undermines the Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial;234 other 
scholars, disagreeing that summary judgment is unconstitutional, 
nevertheless agree that it reduces the jury’s power.235 
 
 228. Id. at 562. 
 229. Id. at 542. 
 230. Id. at 568.  
 231. Id. at 566. 
 232. Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Changing Shape of Federal Civil Pretrial Practice: 
The Disparate Impact on Civil Rights and Employment Discrimination Cases, 158 U. PA. 
L. REV. 517, 549 (2010). 
 233. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 317 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 242–43 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 574–75 (1986); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double 
Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 10 (2010) (“The three 
decisions in one term sent a clear signal to the legal profession that Rule 56 provides a 
useful mechanism for disposing of cases short of trial when the district judge feels the 
plaintiff’s case is not plausible. Many courts responded to this invitation with considerable 
receptivity.”). 
 234. Suja A. Thomas, Why Summary Judgment is Unconstitutional, 93 VA. L. REV. 
139, 139–40 (2007). 
 235. See Edward Brunet, Summary Judgment Is Constitutional, 93 IOWA L. REV. 
1625, 1651 (2008) (arguing that modern procedural devices “reduced the power of the jury 
without substantially damaging the institution of the jury itself”); William E. Nelson, 
Summary Judgment and the Progressive Constitution, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1653, 1660 (2008) 
(“The American economy on which we rely could not function if today’s juries possessed 
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In the last five years, the Supreme Court’s pleading decisions 
have gone beyond summary judgment and given a stamp of approval 
to the dismissal of civil suits at an even earlier stage in litigation, even 
before the parties had engaged in the discovery process.236 In Bell 
Atlantic Co. v. Twombly,237 the Supreme Court required a more 
detailed pleading from the plaintiff than had been previously 
required.238 Previously, a plaintiff could go forward with a case unless 
“it appear[ed] beyond doubt [from the plaintiff’s complaint] that the 
plaintiff [could] prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 
would entitle him to relief.”239 After Twombly, however, the plaintiff 
was required to make a showing of “plausibility”; in the antitrust 
context in which Twombly arose, the Court held that plausibility 
would mean “enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an 
[anticompetitive] agreement was made.”240 The Court then extended 
the plausibility requirement outside of the antitrust context in Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal241 to require judges to “draw on . . . judicial experience and 
common sense” in “[d]etermining whether a complaint states a 
plausible claim for relief.”242 
Professor Arthur Miller has suggested that use of these 
mechanisms has created a “new model of civil procedure.”243 In the 
past, “jurors once were trusted with deciding issues of fact and 
applying their findings to the applicable principles of law following 
the presentation of evidence,” but now, after Twombly and Iqbal, 
“judges are authorized to make these determinations using nothing 
but a naked complaint and their own discretion.”244 The new standards 
increase the judge’s power even beyond the increase already 
experienced with the rise of managerial judging; part of the Court’s 
justification for Twombly’s stricter pleading standards was a concern 
that in the antitrust class action, the high cost of litigation “will push 
cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases before reaching 
those proceedings [summary judgment or trial].”245 Even “careful case 
 
the broad powers of classic, eighteenth-century juries and the accompanying capacity to 
hamper investment and trade.”). 
 236. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 680–84 (2009); Bell Atl. Co. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
 237. 550 U.S. 544. 
 238. Id. at 555. 
 239. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). 
 240. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. 
 241. 556 U.S. 662. 
 242. Id. at 679. 
 243. Miller, supra note 233, at 34. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 559. 
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management” could not offset the risk of cost-driven injustice, “given 
the common lament that the success of judicial supervision in 
checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.”246 This 
growth in judicial power has increased the number of cases dismissed 
before trial.247 
4. Money, Politics, and Judicial Selection 
At the same time that individual trial judges have been growing 
ever more powerful, the increasing influence of money and politics—
and the growing awareness of individual biases—have led to a 
recognition of the need for checks and balances within the judiciary. 
Most state judges are elected, not appointed.248 Although state-court 
judicial elections have been common since the 1850s, these races 
have become significantly more political and more costly in recent 
years.249 In the past, running for judge meant placing “a few yard 
signs and [making] perfunctory remarks to civic or professional 
groups”; today, it often means raising more than a million dollars and 
campaigning over highly contested partisan political issues.250 
It is not surprising that individual judges are less trusted than 
they were in past eras.251 First, the visibility of outside interests in 
choosing judges reduces the public’s trust in the judiciary.252 This lack 
of trust is compounded when judges themselves demonstrate bias or 
corruption. Sometimes the bias may be unconscious; judges are, after 
 
 246. Id. 
 247. See Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to 
Dismiss Under Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 41 (2010) (“[T]he 
summary judgment motion and the motion to dismiss may have similar effects, including 
the significant use of the procedures by courts, a related increased role of judges in 
litigation, and a corresponding increased dismissal of employment discrimination cases.”). 
 248. Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 HARV. 
J. ON LEGIS. 289, 335 (2011); David E. Posen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 
COLUM. L. REV. 265, 266 (2008) (noting that “the majority of U.S. states have subjected 
at least some of their courts to popular elections; roughly ninety percent of state general 
jurisdiction judges are currently selected or retained this way”). 
 249. Thomas R. Phillips, Time Has Come to Reform Judicial Selection System, 
HOUSTON LAW., Mar./Apr. 2003, at 10, 10. 
 250. See Thomas R. Phillips, When Money Talks, the Judiciary Must Balk, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 14, 2002, at B.02 (noting changes in judicial elections resulting from increased 
donations to candidates). 
 251. Charles Gardner Geyh, Why Judicial Elections Stink, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 44 
(2003) (“There seems to be a general consensus that court-directed hostility has been on 
the upswing in recent years, with any number of manifestations.”). 
 252. Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 973, 995 
(2001) (“The public perception is that judges are influenced by campaign 
contributions . . . . Perception in this instance is as important as reality. If voters believe 
that donors call the tune, . . . confidence in the judicial system will be eroded.”). 
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all, subject to the same cognitive biases as anyone else.253 In other 
cases, however, there may be straightforward criminal corruption, as 
there was in Pennsylvania’s “Cash for Kids” scandal, in which 
“judges are believed to have accumulated between $2.6 and $2.8 
million in kickbacks from two different private detention facilities” 
for ordering juveniles to be sent to those facilities.254 Finally, the same 
political pressures are also present when elected officials in the 
executive branch review judicial outcomes. Because of these political 
pressures, executive clemency in criminal cases has become 
exceedingly rare in the modern era—even though, unlike the 
appellate process, it is a remedy specifically mentioned in the U.S. 
Constitution.255 
The existence of appellate review serves as a check on both the 
perception and the reality of biased or corrupt judging. As others have 
stated, “[W]hat is involved in appellate review is, at bottom, simply 
confidence or lack thereof in another person’s decision.”256 Reviewing 
the judge’s decision through the appellate process provides a check 
on potential abuse of power and thereby restores confidence. Lack of 
confidence in a single individual is also minimized by selecting a 
larger panel of decision makers; in the United States, appellate panels 
typically comprise at least three judges.257 
This “rule of three” has often been expressed in terms of “three 
heads . . . being better than one,” though often with little 
explanation.258 Professor Chad Oldfather has expanded on the “three 
 
 253. Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Blinking on the 
Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (2007) (“[J]udges, like 
everyone else, have two cognitive systems for making judgments—the intuitive and the 
deliberative—and the intuitive system appears to have a powerful effect on judges’ 
decision making.”). 
 254. Sarah L. Primrose, When Canaries Won’t Sing: The Failure of the Attorney Self-
Reporting System in the “Cash-for-Kids” Scheme, 36 J. LEGAL PROF. 139, 146 (2011). 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon 
Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1212 (2010). 
 256. RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 113–14 (2008). 
 257. Nguyen v. United States, 539 U.S. 69, 82 (2003) (“[T]he statutory authority for 
courts of appeals to sit in panels . . . requires the inclusion of at least three judges in the 
first instance.”); Samuel P. Jordan, Irregular Panels, 60 ALA. L. REV. 547, 582 (2009) 
(“[A]ll circuits but one permit a panel of two judges to decide the merits of an appeal in 
certain circumstances . . . . Generally, a third judge must be assigned to replace an 
unavailable judge if the two remaining judges do not agree, and may be assigned if the two 
remaining judges agree but decline to exercise their discretion to decide the case by 
quorum.”). 
 258. William W. Schwarzer, Defining Standards of Review, in THE FEDERAL 
APPELLATE JUDICIARY IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 100, 101–02 (Cynthia Harrison 
& Russell R. Wheeler eds., 1989) (“The appellate court’s claim to superior judgment . . . 
lies in numbers, three heads usually being better than one.”). 
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heads are better than one” concept by breaking it down into two 
specific benefits.259 First, there is the advantage of deliberation, in 
which “the need to secure two votes in order to form a majority 
requires the judges to exchange viewpoints and information regarding 
the issues presented, and, perhaps more significantly, requires them to 
take the viewpoint of at least one other person into serious 
consideration.”260 Second, there is the advantage of probability—the 
idea that having more people answers a particular question can 
increase the probability of reaching a correct answer, even when their 
conclusions are independent of each other.261 The probability 
advantage has also been termed the “wisdom of crowds”; research has 
repeatedly shown that aggregating a number of flawed individual 
judgments can provide a significantly more reliable result.262 Finally, 
multi-judge panels can reduce bias and arbitrary decision making, as 
the panel can benefit “not merely by the presence of more than one 
mind but also by the presence of more than one vantage point.”263 
B. The Distributive Power of Appellate Review 
Modern procedural changes at the trial court level tell a story of 
the growing power of trial judges in the face of diminishing power of 
traditional procedural safeguards. Jury trials are diminishing; trial 
judges are taking an increasingly influential role in managing both the 
process of how legal claims are handled as well as substance-based 
decisions about whether cases should be allowed to go forward at 
all.264 The stakes have never been higher for the litigants, as cases 
grow in value and complexity; confidence in individual judges, 
however, is not always high, as money and politics take a toll on 
public trust.265 
The existence of a guaranteed right of appellate review can 
redistribute the effects of these procedures on due process. The jury 
trial once ensured that decisions would not be made by a single 
decisionmaker; now, the rise of appellate review by a multi-judge 
 
 259. Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 308, 328 
(2009). 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. 
 262. See JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS, at xiv (2004) (“[D]espite all 
these limitations, when our imperfect judgments are aggregated in the right way, our 
collective intelligence is often excellent.”).  
 263. Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias 
and Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1209 (1992). 
 264. See supra Part IV.A.2–3. 
 265. See supra Part IV.A.1, 4. 
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panel plays that role. Appellate court supervision also cabins in the 
managerial power of the trial judge. In some cases, the appellate court 
might be needed to reverse an abuse of discretion; in other cases, 
however, the mere availability of appellate review can deter a trial 
judge from abusing that power in the first instance.266 Appellate 
review is also necessary to ensure that viable claims are not 
eliminated at the pleading stage or by summary judgment procedures. 
This review is especially valuable to plaintiffs, who might otherwise 
find that an overworked trial judge’s view of the merits is 
unconsciously influenced by concerns for docket control.267 
The modern increase in large-scale litigation magnifies the 
redistributive due process effect of appellate procedure. Regardless of 
whether this increase in high-stakes litigation is a good thing or a bad 
thing, such complex litigation could not have developed without a 
robust system of appellate review. When a negative outcome could 
bankrupt a party, a reliable outlet for error correction is essential. This 
effect can be seen when parties choose litigation over arbitration in 
some high-stakes cases; though arbitration might otherwise limit the 
cost of dispute resolution, the elimination of appellate remedy may 
simply be too great a risk to bear.268 
In large-stakes and complex cases generally, the question may be 
“not about whether to appeal, but when.”269 In these cases, the cost of 
 
 266. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, 
and Article III, 101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 947 (1988) (“Appellate review can provide an 
effective check against politically influenced adjudication, arbitrary and self-interested 
decisionmaking, and other evils that the separation of powers was designed to prevent.”); 
Resnik, supra note 88, at 607 (stating that appellate review “has the capacity to rectify 
disparities and inequities produced in the first tier and to promote consistent norm 
enforcement”). 
 267. Hillary A. Sale, Judging Heuristics, 35 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 903, 946 (2002) 
(noting “the possibility that the courts are, consciously or unconsciously, utilizing the 
heuristics to clear complex cases that would otherwise remain on the dockets for lengthy 
periods of time”). 
 268. See William H. Knull, III & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farm on International 
Arbitration: Is It Time to Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 531, 533 
(2000) (“[S]ome possible consumers will choose not to arbitrate because their transactions 
are too large to bear the risk of error without adequate means to correct those mistakes, 
instead taking their chances in national courts or agreeing to settle on terms that would not 
be acceptable if a viable dispute resolution alternative were available.”); Guy S. Lipe & 
Timothy J. Tyler, The Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements: Creating Room 
for Choice in International Cases, 33 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 36–37 (2010) (“[C]ourts and 
parties continue to innovate with hybrid procedures that may make litigation less 
expensive and thus more attractive to parties who would want the appellate review 
desirable for ‘bet the farm’ cases.”). 
 269. James E. Pfander & David R. Pekarek Krohn, Interlocutory Review by Agreement 
of the Parties: A Preliminary Analysis, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1043, 1095 n.219 (2011). 
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appealing the trial court’s judgment is likely to be only a small 
fraction of the overall litigation cost; the expense and delay of the 
appeals process improves accuracy without unduly adding to the 
expense of litigation.270 Because appellate remedies play such a 
critical role in complex litigation, appellate rights may even be 
extended before final judgment; thus, for example, the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure were amended to allow interlocutory review of 
class-certification decisions, and similar proposals have been made 
for multidistrict litigation.271 
Within the procedural system, appellate review may therefore 
redistribute power in ways that are consistent with constitutional 
values. Without appeals, the modern procedural system is at risk of 
failing to protect such values; the demise of civil jury trials and the 
increase in criminal plea bargaining, for example, have diminished 
the power of the jury. Likewise, the complexity of modern litigation 
creates risks of legal error that were largely unknown when the Bill of 
Rights was adopted.272 These risks are compounded by political 
realities that place new pressure on judges at the same time that 
judges’ individual power is increasing.273 These procedural realities 
require a safety valve that can correct injustice and distribute power 
away from the individual judge. It is not surprising, then, that 
appellate review has developed to play just this role in modern 
practice. 
V. THE EXPRESSIVE VALUE OF NONDISCRETIONARY 
APPELLATE REVIEW 
Previous Sections of this Article discussed the effect of appellate 
remedies on litigant outcomes, doctrinal consistency, and systemic 
procedure. This Part moves beyond these functions to examine how 
constitutionalizing a nondiscretionary right of appeal would express 
certain social and legal values that shape both culture and norms. 
Unlike the cost-benefit analysis that comes out firmly in favor of 
 
 270. Id. at 1060 n.76, 1095 n.219 (noting that pretrial expenses in large-stakes cases 
often vastly outweigh appellate costs, and concluding that, given the high value of the 
interests at stake in such cases, an appeal is therefore virtually guaranteed regardless of the 
outcome at trial). 
 271. Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate 
Review in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1693–94 (2011) 
(“Congress and the Supreme Court have extended mandatory appellate jurisdiction over 
several categories of interlocutory orders. The time has come to make another categorical 
value judgment, adding certain MDL orders to that list.”). 
 272. See supra Part IV.A.1. 
 273. See supra Part IV.A.2–4. 
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extending appellate rights, the effect on normative values is more 
nuanced: there are significant reasons to protect values on both sides 
of the equation. 
There is no doubt that procedural choices can both reflect and 
shape systemic values. As Professor Judith Resnik has noted, 
procedure has a power beyond the outcomes it creates; it can also 
“instruct about and . . . act out the political system, . . . legitimate 
decisions of the state, . . . dignify the participants, and . . . make 
meaningful the interaction between individuals and the state.”274 
Some have taken this idea even further, stating that “courts exist to 
give meaning to our public values, not to resolve disputes,” and that 
“[c]onstitutional adjudication is the most vivid manifestation of this 
function.”275 Appellate procedure more specifically has been 
described as expressing the background values of fairness, 
predictability, efficiency, and respect for the adversarial process.276 
Even outside procedure, formalizing rules can alter social norms 
and social meaning. Thus, for example, some have suggested that the 
passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 helped give force to the social 
meaning of equality by associating the values of nondiscrimination 
and respect for the law.277 Within the procedural system, the process 
values underlying the American justice system (including, but not 
limited to, the values of participatory governance, legitimacy, respect 
for individual dignity, certainty and predictability, and finality) 
likewise shape societal expectations about what it means to have a 
fair judicial process.278 Formalizing procedural requirements through 
the constitutionalization of appellate review can therefore give added 
force to the values protected by the procedural system. 
A.  The Importance of a Nondiscretionary Appellate Right 
In order to harness the expressive power of a constitutional rule, 
it is important that appellate review be guaranteed to all litigants, 
requiring the appellate court to decide the appeal and without granting 
 
 274. Resnik, supra note 88, at 619; see also Sharona Hoffman, Settling the Matter: 
Does Title I of the ADA Work?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 305, 337 (2008) (“In addition to 
governing human behavior through rules and sanctions, the law conveys social 
messages.”). 
 275. Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1979). 
 276. Sarah M. R. Cravens, Involved Appellate Judging, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 251, 294 
(2004). 
 277. Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 
2043–44 (1996). 
 278. Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and Improving Legal Processes—A Plea for 
“Process Values”, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20–27 (1974) (cataloging process values). 
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it the authority to voluntarily decline jurisdiction. Some 
commentators have argued against such a rule, asserting that a 
discretionary certiorari system can provide a sufficient appellate 
remedy.279 They have contended that the fact that the parties can 
present their arguments to the higher court sufficiently protects 
appellate rights even if the court then denies the appeal.280 This 
position has pragmatic support, as the discretionary denial of review 
has the same outcome as affirming a lower court’s judgment—in both 
cases, the original judgment stands unchanged.281 
Nevertheless, from a procedural point of view, the discretionary 
denial of appellate review is by no means equivalent to an affirmance. 
A court with discretionary review power may deny review for any 
number of reasons other than the perceived correctness of the lower 
court’s ruling. A court may decline review, for example, because the 
underlying judgment is small and its effect appears limited to the 
parties before the court and unlikely to affect future cases; in these 
cases, “mere error in the lower courts is insufficient to warrant 
review.”282 Even if the case is important, a court may deny review if 
the record is unclear or underdeveloped, if the briefing is of low 
quality, or to allow similar cases to develop in the lower courts.283 A 
right to nondiscretionary appellate review, on the other hand, requires 
the reviewing court to act upon the lower court’s judgment—either 
reversing or affirming it, in whole or in part. Much of the power of 
nondiscretionary review stems from this universality. 
A right to nondiscretionary review also requires the court to give 
a reason for its action. Again, therefore, it is necessary to set a 
baseline: what is the minimal opinion that preserves the underlying 
goal of appellate review? Nearly every scholar who has examined that 
question has concluded that, at a minimum, there must be some 
explanation of the reason for the court’s decision; to include no 
explanation at all for the court’s disposition “effectively converts the 
 
 279. See, e.g., Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writs of Certiorari at 14–15, Cent. 
W. Va. Energy Co. v. Wheeling Pittsburgh Steel Corp., 129 S. Ct. 626 (2008) (Nos. 08-
217 & 08-218), 2008 WL 4685267, at *14–15. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Billotti v. Legursky, 975 F.2d 113, 116 (4th Cir. 1992) (stating that because of 
administrative limitations, a system of appeals as of right would not provide “a more 
meaningful opportunity to be heard than does West Virginia’s system of discretionary 
appeals”). 
 282. Hon. Craig T. Enoch & Michael S. Truesdale, Issues and Petitions: The Impact 
on Supreme Court Practice, 31 ST. MARY’S L.J. 565, 605 (2000) (“If an issue fails to 
demonstrate an error of jurisprudential significance, but only one affecting the parties to a 
case, then perhaps that error is less likely to survive the scrutiny of the petition process.”). 
 283. Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 917–19 (1950). 
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statutory appeal of right into a denial of a petition for certiorari,” as 
“in both cases the decision maker has declined to explain its 
decision.”284 The use of non-precedential opinions combined with 
rules against citation of those opinions has been more controversial; 
some have defended them as a time-saving device that prioritizes the 
need for the parties before the court to obtain a relatively speedy 
decision by de-prioritizing the interests of others not currently before 
the court.285 Others, however, have criticized the practice as 
antithetical to the development of the common law by inhibiting the 
development of binding legal rules.286 Constitutional arguments have 
been made to support both sides of such no-citation rules.287 
This Article does not take a side in the particulars of that debate, 
but seeks only to identify the minimum rule needed to protect 
effective appellate review. In that regard, this Article identifies the 
key aspects of a judicial opinion as (1) providing at least a brief 
reference to the substantive law or reasoning that drives the 
 
 284. William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New 
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 285 
(1996) (citing Jerry L. Mashaw, Textualism, Constitutionalism, and the Interpretation of 
Federal Statutes, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 827, 838 (1991)) (“In our law . . . the exercise 
of a power to speak authoritatively as an interpreter carries with it an obligation to explain 
the grounds upon which the interpreter gives that authoritative judgment.”); Alvin B. 
Rubin, Bureaucratization of the Federal Courts: The Tension Between Justice and 
Efficiency, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 648, 655 (1980) (“Every judge should be required to 
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the result to the litigants but also to enable other litigants to comprehend its precedential 
value and the limits to its authority.”). But see Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 633, 659 (1995) (“[W]hen context, case-by-case decisionmaking, and 
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do not come without a price.”). 
 285. Hart v. Massanari, 266 F.3d 1155, 1178 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Deciding a large 
portion of our cases in this fashion frees us to spend the requisite time drafting 
precedential opinions in the remaining cases. Should courts allow parties to cite to these 
dispositions, however, much of the time gained would likely vanish.”); Kenneth Anthony 
Laretto, Precedent, Judicial Power, and the Constitutionality of “No-Citation” Rules in 
the Federal Courts of Appeals, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1037, 1038 (2002) (“[N]o-citation rules 
are . . . constitutionally justified as applied to decisions that are objectively non-
precedential.”). 
 286. See, e.g., Anastasoff v. United States, 223 F.3d 898, 898 (8th Cir.), vacated as 
moot, 235 F.3d 1054 (8th Cir. 2000) (en banc); Daniel N. Hoffman, Publicity and the 
Judicial Power, 3 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 343, 353 (2001) (“The freedom of litigants to 
call to our attention and to the courts’ attention any precedents and principles they deem 
inconsistent with the result advocated by the other side is a necessary condition for having 
the confidence we need. Otherwise there is no sufficient check, scrutiny, or 
accountability.”). 
 287. Massanari, 266 F.3d at 1178 (concluding that such rules are constitutionally 
permitted); Anastasoff, 223 F.3d at 898 (concluding that they are not). 
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decision;288 and (2) allowing future citation to that decision for its 
persuasive value, even if it is designated as non-precedential.289 
Reason-giving ensures a minimum of due process and prohibits the 
court from effectively declining to review the underlying judgment.290 
And even an opinion designated as non-precedential can fulfill the 
error-correction function of appellate review; it still resolves the 
dispute in the case at hand.291 Furthermore, since no two cases are 
exactly alike, even opinions designated as precedential can generally 
be distinguished on the facts.292 Yet, the ability to cite appellate 
decisions—whether formally precedential or not—is crucial to the 
appellate functions that extend beyond mere error correction: 
encouraging the development and refinement of legal principles; 
increasing uniformity and standardization in the application of legal 
rules; and promoting respect for the rule of law.293 If parties are 
precluded from arguing that their case should be resolved similarly—
or differently—from other cases that share similar characteristics, 
then appellate courts would not be able to ensure uniform treatment of 
 
 288. See Daniel N. Hoffman, supra note 286, at 353 (“How much must we be told to 
enable us to understand what the law is, according to which the conflict has been 
resolved? ‘Affirmed in light of the precedent, P v. D’ might conceivably suffice. But 
‘Affirmed, Rule 51’ cannot suffice, because rule 51, which simply permits summary 
dispositions, is not a rule of substantive law. It does not even pretend to explain why this 
plaintiff, or those similarly situated, are entitled to prevail. At most, it suggests that the 
court has deliberated and, for unknown reasons, has determined that such is the case.”). 
 289. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judging in 
the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1469 (2003) (describing a proposed rule which 
would “allow the citation of unpublished opinions solely for persuasive value”); see also 
FED. R. APP. P. 32.1 (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of federal judicial 
opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have been: (i) designated as 
‘unpublished,’ . . . and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”); ROBERT TIMOTHY 
REAGAN, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., CITING UNPUBLISHED FEDERAL APPELLATE OPINIONS 
ISSUED BEFORE 2007, at 2–4 (2007) (showing variation among courts’ positions on citing 
unpublished opinions through a series of tables). 
 290. Richman & Reynolds, supra note 284, at 285; see also Paul R. Verkuil, 
Crosscurrents in Anglo-American Administrative Law, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685, 703 
(1986) (“The statement of reasons ingredient is critical to American due process 
jurisprudence . . . . [I]t gives the parties notice of the basis on which their claims are 
denied[;] . . . it satisfies the parties and the public that the democratic principle of rational 
decisionmaking has been vindicated; and . . . it forces intellectual discipline upon deciding 
officials, which enhances the correctness of the initial decision process.”). 
 291. See, e.g., Massanari, 266 F.3d at 1178 (“An unpublished disposition is, more or 
less, a letter from the court to parties familiar with the facts, announcing the result and the 
essential rationale of the court’s decision.”). 
 292. See Shawn J. Bayern, Case Interpretation, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 125, 169 
(2008) (“[D]ecisions are stated and then narrowed or expanded as facts test the generality 
of those decisions. The law that evolves is bound to—rather than insensitive to—the facts 
that give rise to it.”). 
 293. See supra notes 14–17. 
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like cases and would not be able to aid in the development of the 
underlying legal principles. 
Nondiscretionary review combined with reason-giving therefore 
gives expression to values of individualized justice, litigant dignity, 
and institutional legitimacy of the judiciary. Nevertheless, there are 
also costs to promoting these values within the appellate system. 
Nondiscretionary review also enforces a preference for accuracy over 
finality, while it diminishes the power of individual states—especially 
of the political branches of government within those states—to 
exercise policy choices in funding the judiciary. 
B. Institutional Legitimacy and Individual Dignity 
Discretionary review focuses primarily on systemic values and 
permits the Supreme Court to exercise what Professor Ratner has 
termed the two “essential appellate functions under the 
Constitution”—to resolve conflicts among lower courts and to 
maintain the supremacy of federal law.294 Nondiscretionary review, 
however, promotes error correction in a wider variety of cases; it is 
largely the purview of intermediate appellate courts, whose very 
creation was left to the will of Congress.295 The appellate judicial role 
in error correction is essential to a functioning system—and it is a 
role that is not replicated in any other branch of government.296 
Because nondiscretionary review better ensures error correction 
in individual cases, it also better comports with popular conceptions 
of justice and due process. Litigants routinely expect to have a right to 
appeal, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s statements that no such 
right exists under the U.S. Constitution.297 The idea of justice on 
appeal is firmly established in popular culture: 
 
 294. Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157, 161 (1960). 
 295. See id. 
 296. See Paul D. Carrington, A Critical Assessment of the Cultural and Institutional 
Roles of Appellate Courts, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 231, 235 (2007) (“Yes, of course, 
appellate courts make law. But we do have other institutions to provide that service. The 
indispensable task of the appellate court is to correct error, or perhaps more precisely, to 
convince the parties and their counsel that the possibility of incorrect application of the 
law has been seriously considered by judges of rank and security, and to remind trial 
judges that they are indeed confined by the law in the choices that they may make in 
response to overtures from parties.”). 
 297. Arkin, supra note 8, at 504 (“[M]ost people—if not most law school graduates—
simply assume that the constitutional guarantee of due process of law includes some right 
to appeal a criminal conviction.”). 
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Like Miranda warnings, the expectation of appellate review 
following a trial court conviction is deeply embedded in our 
national consciousness, as exemplified by fictional and filmic 
protagonists who cry out at the jury’s verdict, “I’ll appeal!” or 
who languish—perhaps temporarily—in prison while their 
destiny is in the hands of an appellate court. It would surprise 
many Americans to learn that there is, in fact, no right to such 
review as there is a right to trial by jury and a right not to 
incriminate oneself. By this admittedly imperfect measure of 
“national culture,” the right of appeal deserves a loftier stature 
than it now enjoys.298 
It is likely that the pervasive statutory right to appeal has allowed 
the concept of appellate justice to permeate through the national 
culture. In a sense, then, constitutionalizing the right to an appeal 
would simply reflect the status quo that many people believe already 
exists.299 If the public were aware that such appellate rights were in 
fact not guaranteed—and that such rights are not available in every 
state at the present time, and could be taken away by other cash-
strapped state legislatures at a future time—then the justice system 
could well face a crisis of legitimacy.300 As other scholars have noted, 
the value of the appellate system’s ability to increase public trust in 
judicial outcomes may exceed the amount of error correction actually 
accomplished.301 
This institutional legitimacy value also overlaps with the values 
of individual dignity and participation in the justice system. Again, 
the instrumental importance of error correction may be subsidiary to 
the process values of participation, dignity, and trust: even when 
litigants lose their appeal on the merits, empirical research has shown 
that the mere fact of being heard promotes a sense of procedural 
fairness and leaves people feeling better about the outcome.302 A right 
of appeal allows litigants “to present the evidence and the arguments 
they consider essential to protect their rights.”303 When litigants 
appeal an adverse verdict, one goal is to reverse that outcome—but 
 
 298. Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 985–86. 
 299. See id. (noting that litigants expect a right of appeal); see also supra notes 1–2 
(noting similar popular perceptions). 
 300. See Cavallaro, supra note 50, at 980. 
 301. Id. at 981; Dalton, supra note 12, at 98. 
 302. See SCOTT BARCLAY, AN APPEALING ACT: WHY PEOPLE APPEAL IN CIVIL 
CASES 12, 101–12 (1999) (analyzing the result of an empirical study of why people 
choose to appeal, and finding that litigants appeal because they seek “to be heard fairly,” 
and concluding that a fair hearing may meet their appellate goals “even if the subsequent 
outcome is negative”).  
 303. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 593. 
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another goal is “to be heard fairly by someone in authority in regard 
to the issue that the litigants think is at the heart of their dispute.”304 
The Supreme Court has, in the past, recognized that “a purpose of 
procedural due process is to convey to the individual a feeling that the 
government has dealt with him fairly, as well as to minimize the risk 
of mistaken deprivations of protected interests.”305 
Professor Dalton’s explanation of the appellate process may shed 
light on the mechanism of how even a loss on appeal can improve 
trust in judicial procedure. In his view, the state’s power over 
individuals in the judicial process is so great, that before it acts on 
that power, “the state must satisfy itself several times over that such a 
judgment is warranted”; likewise, “before depriving an individual of 
liberty the state must act in a way that evidences and reaffirms respect 
for that liberty, lest we all be cheapened, diminished, and rendered 
more vulnerable.”306 The appellate system promotes participation by 
allowing losing litigants to seek a second chance at justice by 
presenting their concerns to a higher tribunal.307 Even if they do not 
prevail on appeal, a ruling on the substance of their claim by a second 
tribunal gives losing litigants a greater voice in the justice system; it 
reassures litigants “that they are getting the personal attention of 
judges that is the heart of the Due Process guaranteed by state and 
federal constitutions.”308 
In this regard, the trial system and appellate system protect 
different litigant interests: at the trial court, the litigant’s dispute is 
with the opposing party, and at the appellate level the litigant’s 
dispute is with the state. Due process at the trial level protects the 
litigant’s right to complain about—or to defend against—the 
opposing party’s actions. On appeal, however, the complaint is not 
that the opposing party acted wrongfully, but rather than the trial 
court below acted wrongfully in its handling of the underlying 
dispute. Due process at the trial level can at most give the litigant a 
sense of being heard in the dispute with the opposing party; by 
 
 304. Id. 
 305. Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 262 (1978); see also Douglas Laycock, Due 
Process and Separation of Powers: The Effort to Make the Due Process Clause 
Nonjusticiable, 60 TEX. L. REV. 875, 887 (1982) (“The sense of unfair treatment felt by 
victims of inadequate procedure is precisely the sort of individual harm that constitutional 
rights and judicial review are meant to protect against.”). 
 306. Dalton, supra note 12, at 102. 
 307. See Lawrence B. Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 321 (2004) 
(“Procedure without participation may command obedience, but it cannot win principled 
allegiance.”). 
 308. Carrington, supra note 296, at 236. 
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definition, it cannot give the litigant a sense of being heard with 
regard to the court’s action. Because it is the trial court that ultimately 
takes action by imposing (or failing to impose) civil damages or 
criminal penalties, the litigant who seeks to appeal will have a 
complaint about the trial court’s action that is separate and distinct 
from any complaint against the opposing party. Thus, although the 
denial of a discretionary appeal may ultimately have the same 
outcome as an affirmance on the merits (both actions would leave the 
trial court’s action undisturbed), the discretionary denial of review 
does not provide the same sense of being heard—it does not 
“demonstrate to the world that someone [backed by the state’s 
authority] has heard and understood the substance of the appellant’s 
contention.”309 As a result, the discretionary review in a certiorari 
system may work quite well as a second-level layer of protection, but 
it does not ensure “adequate and effective review” of the trial court’s 
action, and it is therefore no substitute for a first-level appeal as of 
right.310 
Finally, a nondiscretionary right to appeal also protects a 
litigant’s dignity by diffusing the power of an individual judge—a 
diffusion that is especially important in an era where the power of the 
trial judge is larger than ever before.311 With a right to appeal, a single 
person is no longer in control of the litigant’s destiny; instead, the 
power of the state must be exercised through a multi-judge appellate 
panel in addition to the trial court. In this way, “[d]ecentralized 
decisionmaking limits the amount of power vested in a single 
individual[, and] . . . the coercion of the state is legitimated by the 
limitations on concentrations of power.”312 The appellate process 
thereby ensures not just that the litigant will have a voice in the 
process, but that the litigant will lose only if a larger number of voices 
join together in that decision. Thus, win or lose, a right to appeal 
gives individuals a voice in the justice system, endorses the ideals of 
 
 309. Paul D. Carrington, Justice on Appeal in Criminal Cases: A Twentieth-Century 
Perspective, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 459, 472 (2009). 
 310. Peter D. Marshall, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Appeal, 22 DUKE J. 
COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 45 (2011) (noting that different countries provide different types of 
appellate review in criminal cases, but arguing that “[w]hile the exact form that an appeal 
takes may vary, all appeals must afford a convicted person the ability to access an 
adequate and effective review of conviction and sentence”). 
 311. See supra Part IV. 
 312. Judith Resnik, Tiers, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 837, 851 (1984). 
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human dignity and collective decision making, and reflects a deeply 
held cultural expectation.313 
C. Finality, Federalism, and the Political Process 
Appellate review necessarily creates a tension between the 
values of finality and accuracy. The value of accuracy is at the heart 
of appellate review, and underlies both the error-correction function 
of review and the public-trust function.314 The existence of 
compelling inaccuracies that are incapable of correction stokes 
distrust of the justice system generally; this effect is highly visible 
both in the number of “innocence projects” around the country that 
seek to free the wrongly convicted and the call for constitutional 
protection of actual innocence claims.315 
In almost every case, however, the value of accuracy will 
eventually give way to a need for finality, as evidenced by the 
universal existence of appellate deadlines.316 The value of finality is 
not just a matter of efficiency: it is also “an expression of a desire to 
 
 313. See Lena Husani Hughes, Time Waits for No Man—But Is Tolled for Certain 
Post-Judgment Motions: Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4) and the Fate of 
Withdrawn Post-Judgment Motions, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 319, 357–58 (2012) (“[T]he 
right of appeal remains, for many, an important indication that the justice system values 
accuracy in its decisions and promotes fair treatment of litigants who participate in the 
system.”); see also Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, The Psychology of Procedural Justice in 
the Federal Courts, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 127, 177 (2011) (“The legitimacy of our legal 
system is premised on its constitutional roots, which guarantee due process of law. But in 
practice, the subjective assessments about the quality of justice received will also 
influence participants’ perceptions about legitimacy—in particular, the quality of 
procedural justice received.”). 
 314. See supra Part I. 
 315. See, e.g., Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate Process, 93 
MARQ. L. REV. 591, 637 (2009) (“The empirical record shows that the American system 
for appealing criminal convictions regularly fails in its most important role of protecting 
against erroneous conviction of the innocent.”); Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence 
Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 142, 160 (1970) 
(“I would also allow an exception to the concept of finality where a convicted defendant 
makes a colorable showing that an error, whether ‘constitutional’ or not, may be producing 
the continued punishment of an innocent man.”); Brandon L. Garrett, Claiming Innocence, 
92 MINN. L. REV. 1629, 1699 (2007) (“The lack of a capstone innocence claim under the 
Federal Constitution has resulted in a conflicted regime.”). 
 316. See Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, When Is Finality . . . Final? Rehearing and 
Resurrection in the Supreme Court, 12 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 1, 2 (2011) (“A case that 
is still on appeal is not yet final in this sense, and so an appellate court can reverse a trial 
court decision that was perfectly correct when rendered but that has become incorrect by 
the time of the appeal. After finality attaches, however, the judgment stands even if the 
law later changes.” (footnote omitted)); Catherine T. Struve, Time and the Courts: What 
Deadlines and Their Treatment Tell Us About the Litigation System, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 
601, 622–23 (2009) (describing the strict nature of post-judgment motion deadlines). 
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limit the time between the eruption of a dispute, its resolution, and the 
implementation of a solution[;] . . . a view that fluidity, flexibility, 
and open-endedness work injustice, lead to instability, and undermine 
the rule of law.”317 Without finality, “[t]here comes a point where a 
procedural system which leaves matters perpetually open no longer 
reflects humane concern but merely anxiety and a desire for 
immobility.”318 
In an individual case, it can be difficult enough to draw a line 
between the competing values of accuracy and finality. When the 
question of individual justice is compelling enough, even a reasonable 
deadline will give way in the need for “fundamental fairness”; thus, 
for example, when a man on death row was effectively abandoned 
after his attorneys left their law firm, the Supreme Court was willing 
to waive the appeal deadlines.319 Even with the compelling facts of 
this case—the life-or-death consequence, the lack of counsel, and the 
lack of an opportunity to present an ineffective assistance of counsel 
claim on direct appeal—the Supreme Court divided seven to two 
about whether the value of accuracy or the value of finality would 
control the outcome.320 
The balance between accuracy and finality within a system of 
nondiscretionary review becomes even more difficult to assess when 
federalism concerns are thrown into the mix.321 States must make 
political choices about the resources they are able to allocate to their 
judicial systems, and this means making a choice about when to focus 
those resources away from correcting inaccurate judgments and 
 
 317. Resnik, supra note 312, at 851–52. 
 318. Paul M. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State 
Prisoners, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 452–53 (1963). 
 319. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012). 
 320. Id. at 927 (acknowledging the values of comity and finality, but concluding that 
“fundamental fairness [remains] the central concern of the writ of habeas corpus”); id. at 
929 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that federal habeas corpus review undermines the 
states’ “practical interest in the finality of their criminal judgments”). 
 321. Cases that fit within the Supreme Court’s exclusive original jurisdiction are an 
interesting example of this balance; by their nature, these cases necessarily escape 
appellate review. However, these are also the types of cases where finality is most 
urgently needed. See, e.g., Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 504 (1893) (noting that 
the Court has original jurisdiction in boundary disputes between states, “which otherwise 
might be the fruitful cause of prolonged and harassing conflicts”); see also Anne-Marie C. 
Carstens, Lurking in the Shadows of Judicial Process: Special Masters in the Supreme 
Court’s Original Jurisdiction Cases, 86 MINN. L. REV. 625, 632–33 (2001) (explaining 
the Supreme Court’s original—and exclusive—jurisdiction in interstate disputes and 
noting that this “exclusive nature of the Court’s original jurisdiction thus requires the 
Court to function in all respects as a trial court, or a court of first instance, in cases 
between state opponents”). 
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“toward more productive ends.”322 If fundamental due process is 
interpreted to require a nondiscretionary right of appeal, then state 
freedom to make a political choice about whether to offer an appeal is 
limited. Thus, for example, a state such as Virginia may have a policy 
that emphasizes the supervisory role of the appellate system over the 
error-correction function; by relying on a system of discretionary 
appeals, appellate courts are able to focus their resources on the cases 
that raise questions that are important to the jurisprudence of the state. 
Creating a nondiscretionary review requirement would turn the 
appellate judiciary into courts of error correction and would thereby 
limit the state’s ability to channel its judicial resources as it sees fit. 
Adopting a constitutional requirement for appeals that overrides 
state political processes is problematic: the political process most 
clearly represents the public’s policy choices, and it remains flexible 
to changing conditions.323 As some have pointed out, “The legislature 
creates substantive rights; why should it not decide how vigorously it 
wants to enforce those rights and what procedures will suffice?”324 
Justice Brandeis famously noted that the states can serve as 
laboratories of democracy, and can “try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country”;325 why not allow 
states to decide for themselves whether to offer a nondiscretionary 
right of appeal? 
Constitutionalizing a right to appeal is therefore not without cost: 
it enforces a preference for accuracy over finality, and it does so at 
the cost of individual states’ policy choices. In one sense, this may be 
the case with any constitutional protection. As Alexander Bickel 
noted half a century ago—and as many academic commentators have 
explored in the interim—some of the Court’s most important work is 
explicitly countermajoritarian, protecting the politically 
disempowered against majority rule.326 Of course, on a national level 
 
 322. Bator, supra note 318, at 453. 
 323. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court’s Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 
1, 58 (2004) (“Public participation seems easier in state and local politics; this may be so 
because the issues seem more immediate, because citizens are more likely to know state or 
local politicians personally, or because the barriers to entry into politics are lower at the 
state and local level.”). 
 324. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 593. 
 325. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting). 
 326. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16–17 (1962); see 
also Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of the 
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 (2002) (“For decades, 
legal academics have struggled with the ‘countermajoritarian difficulty’: the problem of 
justifying the exercise of judicial review by unelected and ostensibly unaccountable judges 
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the right to appeal is not countermajoritarian; almost every 
jurisdiction chooses to provide appeals as of right.327 But in the 
individual states that do not currently offer such rights, the 
constitutionalization of a right to appeal would have a 
countermajoritarian effect and would create “interference with state 
autonomy.”328 
Thus, constitutionalizing the right to appeal requires making a 
choice between several competing values, and it comes at a cost both 
to the political branches of government and to state autonomy. Is it 
worth it? Although it is a close call, there are systemic reasons to 
believe that the protection of individual rights through the appellate 
process can outweigh the importance of deference to state political 
choices. As Professor Leubsdorf has argued, “[C]ourts should not 
leave questions of access and participation to the political process, for 
access and participation constitute an integral part of the democratic 
system that legitimizes that process.”329 
Current research into the juvenile justice system illustrates the 
importance of appellate review in protecting the access and 
participation rights of the politically disempowered, suggesting that 
appellate remedies tend to be underutilitized in the juvenile justice 
system.330 Across the United States, juveniles who are adjudicated 
delinquent (the juvenile equivalent of a criminal conviction) appeal in 
only five out of every one thousand cases.331 Rates vary significantly 
from state to state, but do not seem to correlate with the level of state 
protection: instead, appeals are more common when system 
 
in what we otherwise deem to be a political democracy.”); Corinna Barrett Lain, The 
Unexceptionalism of “Evolving Standards,” 57 UCLA L. REV. 365, 417 (2009) (“The 
whole point of having an unelected judiciary is its ability to serve as a check on majority 
rule, which is why the Supreme Court’s countermajoritarian capacity undergirds most 
every normative theory of judicial review.”). 
 327. Lain, supra note 326, at 418. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 598. But see Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural 
Safeguards of Federal Jurisdiction, 124 HARV. L. REV. 869, 916 (2010) (noting that, at 
the federal level, the political process has successfully safeguarded the Supreme Court’s 
appellate jurisdiction; although there have been times when “Congress has successfully 
displaced the inferior federal courts,” it has nevertheless “proven far more difficult for 
Congress to curb the Supreme Court's appellate review power”). While these structural 
safeguards have protected the Supreme Court’s supervisory appellate power, they do not 
protect the error-correction function of the intermediate federal courts or of state courts. 
 330. See Megan Annitto, Juvenile Justice on Appeal, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671, 672 
(2012) (“Although the discretion of judges in juvenile delinquency cases is not 
‘unreviewable,’ in practical terms, juvenile delinquency cases are rarely subject to 
appellate review.”). 
 331. Id. at 716. 
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participants have “an awareness of the importance of appeals.”332 In 
Florida, the state with the highest appeal rate, one juvenile public 
defender emphasized the role of appeals in guaranteeing basic rights: 
she stated, “If someone came to me and wanted to build a model 
office to represent juveniles, I would say to them, if you have ten 
dollars, put nine of them into having a good system of appellate 
review.”333 When appellate protections are offered in juvenile cases, 
they have offered significant protection.334 Appellate review has 
proved especially important in guarding against wrongful convictions 
due to false confession, as the risk of such false confessions is much 
higher with minors than with adults and increases as the age of the 
accused offender decreases.335 
It is interesting that appellate review is so rarely used in juvenile 
cases, even in states that otherwise provide robust appellate remedies, 
and even when juveniles have a de jure right to appeal their 
adjudications. Given the different appeal rates across states, it does 
not appear that appeals are simply unneeded or unwanted in juvenile 
cases; instead, it appears to be more a function of the legal culture and 
awareness of appellate protections.336 In this regard, the expressive 
power of a constitutional rule may outweigh a statutory right; the very 
act of constitutionalization may heighten the role of appellate 
remedies within the larger legal culture.337 As Professor Leubsdorf 
has written, constitutional law can “improve civil procedure by 
focusing legislative attention on dark spots and neglected values and 
by forcing the system to respond to an individual’s claim of 
injustice.”338 Even if the impact of this change were limited to 
marginalized groups or outlier cases, the overall increase in justice 
would be consistent with the goals of due process.339 
 
 332. Id. at 716–17. 
 333. Id. at 730. 
 334. See id. at 717. 
 335. See id. at 732 (“A study of falsely convicted youth found that 31% of exonerated 
youth that were previously convicted had falsely confessed to the crime, mostly due to 
police inducement. The number increased to nearly half when isolating younger juveniles 
ages eleven to fourteen.”). 
 336. See id. at 717. 
 337. For an empirical analysis of the expressive function of law, see Patricia Funk, Is 
There an Expressive Function of Law? An Empirical Analysis of Voting Laws with 
Symbolic Fines, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 135, 156 (2007) (concluding that “governmental 
actions which appeal to the civic duty (i.e. by legally prescribing it) may have substantial 
effects,” whereas “actions which target at reducing the costs of provision of the public 
good might be less effective in certain situations”). 
 338. Leubsdorf, supra note 12, at 615. 
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In order to tap the expressive power of constitutional 
recognition, however, the effect of that power must be distributed 
throughout the legal culture. Recognizing the need for marginalized 
groups to obtain justice is a substantive end that is susceptible to 
being excluded by the political process.340 Constitutional recognition 
of the process values underlying appellate rights, by contrast, is less 
susceptible to encroachment; generalized process values are better 
able to shape the larger legal culture than are more politically 
controversial substantive ends.341 The most effective way to protect 
the substantive rights of marginalized groups may therefore be to 
enshrine procedural rights of appeal for all.342 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should explicitly recognize a due process 
right of appeal in both civil and criminal cases. Appeals play a 
number of important roles in the justice system: they allow the 
correction of legal and factual errors, encourage the development and 
refinement of legal principles, increase uniformity and 
standardization in the application of legal rules, and promote respect 
for the rule of law. Nearly every U.S. jurisdiction has found that the 
benefits of a robust appellate system outweigh the costs, and has 
therefore chosen to protect appellate rights though the political 
process. Without constitutional protection, however, these rights are 
not universally guaranteed—and they are not immune from the 
demands of declining state budgets. Recognizing a constitutional right 
to appeal would ensure that they are extended to all litigants, even in 
times of fiscal stress. 
 
intervention and formulation of objective standards. This is particularly true when due 
process is violated.”). 
 340. See Peter L. Markowitz, Deportation Is Different, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1299, 
1343 (2010) (noting that criminal defendants are a “politically disfavored class of 
litigants”). 
 341. See Rosen-Zvi & Fisher, supra note 61, at 81, 155 (acknowledging that 
procedural change happens “as a result of political, social, and economic transformations 
and reflect emergent social values” and advocating for the elimination of the civil/criminal 
distinction, though disputing that all procedural rights should be distributed equally “in the 
name of abstract and uncritically accepted notions of fairness and due process”). 
 342. This conclusion in some ways combines Derrick Bell’s “interest convergence” 
theory, which suggests that minority rights would be more likely to obtain recognition 
when they converge with majority interests, Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of 
Education and the Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–24 (1980), 
with the notion that procedure in general is necessary to protect substantive rights. See 
Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1961, 1981 (2007) (“The primary goal of procedure is to produce outcomes that 
enforce the substantive law properly.”). 
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Constitutional recognition of a right to appeal would also 
comport with modern litigation realities. The Supreme Court’s 
criminal and punitive-damages doctrines have already implicitly 
recognized a right to appeal, and making that protection explicit 
would ensure doctrinal consistency. Moreover, the procedural system 
has changed along with substantive doctrine; now, both civil and 
criminal procedures have grown in ways that depend on an effective 
appellate system. If appellate remedies were removed from the 
modern procedural framework, the system as a whole would no 
longer provide adequate due process protection. Finally, recognizing 
constitutional protection for appellate rights would also express a 
normative view, promoting the values of institutional legitimacy, 
respect for individual dignity, predictability, and accuracy. Appellate 
procedure has earned a place in our contemporary understanding of 
due process; it is time to recognize its role as a fundamental guarantee 
of fair judicial practice. 
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